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Many protocols and experiments in quantum information science are described
in terms of simple measurements on qubits. However, in an experimental im-
plementation, the exact description of the measurement is usually more compli-
cated. If there is a claim made from the results of an experiment by using the
simplified measurement description, then do the claims still hold when the more
realistic description is taken into account? We present a “squashing” model that
decomposes the realistic measurement description into first a map, followed by
a simplified measurement. The squashing model then provides a connection
between a realistic measurement and an ideal measurement. If the squashing
model exists for a given measurement, then all claims made about a measure-
ment using the simplified description also apply to the complicated one. We
give necessary and sufficient conditions to determine when this model exists.
We show how it can be applied to quantum key distribution, entanglement veri-
fication, and other quantum communication protocols. We also consider several
examples of detectors commonly used in quantum communication to determine
if they have squashing models.
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Communication technology plays an important role in today’s society. Many
communication tasks are now possible since the expansion of the internet in
the past fifteen years: everything from email to internet banking. All of cur-
rent communications technology only uses classical communication. However,
quantum communication enables new communication tasks that are otherwise
impossible using classical communication. Quantum cryptography, for example,
allows for a different level of security from classical cryptography.
The problem of implementing quantum communication protocols lies in the
fragility of quantum systems. They require extreme precision and control in or-
der to be used effectively. In theory, quantum systems can be simply described,
and quantum communication protocols are often devised using small dimen-
sional, simple quantum states. However, in experiments, we currently do not
have the control required to create these simple systems exactly. This creates a
gap between what systems quantum communication protocols require in theory,
and what experimentalists actually use in practice. This begs the question: if
an experimentalist implements a quantum communication protocol inexactly,
do the claims of any theories requiring an exact implementation still hold true?
This thesis tries to answer this question in part, and in particular, we focus on
bridging the gap between measurements required in theory, and measurements
performed in practice.
First, we give some background on the field of quantum communication.
In particular we outline two quantum communication protocols: quantum key
distribution and entanglement verification.
1.1 Quantum Communication
Quantum communication is a broad field containing all uses for communication
using quantum signals. In contrast, signals in classical communication are called
bits, with value either ”0” or ”1”. In quantum communication, signals are
typically quantum bits, or qubits. They are represented by a quantum system
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with two levels |0〉 and |1〉. In experiments, these signals are typically realized
using single photons, and information is encoded in one of their degrees of
freedom. For example, the polarization of the photon may be used for this
purpose: horizontally polarized light could represent the state |0〉 and vertically
polarized light could represent the state |1〉.
Since quantum signals are used for communication, it can be advantageous
for communicating parties to have other quantum mechanical resources at their
disposal. For example, many of the protocols in quantum communication take
advantage of one of the most striking features of quantum mechanics: entan-
glement. Entangled states such as |ψ+〉 = 1/
√
2(|00〉+ |11〉) have the property
that they cannot be factored into a separable form |ψ+〉 6= |φA〉 ⊗ |φB〉. This
means that there is a strong correlation between the two systems A and B that
cannot be represented in a classical way; entanglement is a purely quantum
phenomenon. Entanglement is an essential part of quantum communication as
it enables many protocols.
For example, there is a quantum communication protocol called superdense
coding [BW92] that uses entanglement to communicate two classical bits of
information by only sending a single qubit from one party to another. More
precisely, each party begins with one qubit of a two-qubit entangled state, such
as |ψ+〉 = 1/
√
2(|00〉 + |11〉). Then the party who wishes to communicate
information (usually called Alice) applies a quantum operation on her qubit that
depends on which two bits Alice would like to communicate. She then sends her
modified qubit to the receiving party (usually called Bob), who jointly measures
the qubit Alice sent and his qubit. From this measurement he gets two classical
bits. In this way, Alice communicates two bits of information only by sending a
single qubit to Bob (with the help of shared entanglement). Superdense coding
is just one of many protocols that demonstrate how quantum communication
can accomplish tasks that cannot be done by only using classical systems.
There are many other interesting and useful tasks in quantum communica-
tion that cannot be performed by only using classical communication, such as
quantum teleportation [BBJ+93]. In this thesis we will primarily focus on two
such tasks: quantum key distribution, commonly known as QKD, and entan-
glement verification. However, the results presented in this thesis, Chapter 2 in
particular, are more general: they can be applied to many different quantum
communication protocols. We now describe these two quantum communication
protocols in the following sections.
1.1.1 Quantum Key Distribution
The goal of quantum key distribution (QKD) is to securely distribute a random
binary string (a key) between two parties (usually called Alice and Bob) over a
public quantum channel. The key generated in QKD can be used in different
ways, but typically it is used by Alice and Bob to communicate classically in
a secure way. In particular, Alice adds the generated key to a classical binary
message, and sends this encrypted message to Bob. Bob then adds the key to
the encrypted message to decipher the original message. An eavesdropper can
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get no information out of the encrypted message, because to her it is just a list
of random 0s and 1s. This method of communication can be proven secure in
















Figure 1.1: The use of the one time pad to encode a message. Alice adds the
message she would like to send to the key she shares with Bob. She sends
the key over a classical channel to Bob, and an eavesdropper, Eve, may see
the encrypted message. Bob adds the encrypted message to the key, and he
decrypts the original message. Eve can gain no information about the message
because all she sees is the encrypted message: a list of random binary numbers.
The challenge of QKD is to distribute a random binary string by sending
quantum signals from one party to another. An eavesdropper, usually called
Eve, may interfere with the quantum signals sent. Her goal is to gain as much
information about the signals as she can. However, to learn information about
the signals, she must modify them, and hence introduce errors in Bob’s mea-
surement. Therefore, Eve is trying to maximize the amount of information she
can get while trying to minimize the errors she introduces. In addition, Eve
is allowed to use anything possible by quantum mechanics to extract informa-
tion from the quantum signals between Alice and Bob. Despite Eve’s powerful
attack, it is still possible to perform QKD, as long as the errors observed by
Bob are below a certain threshold. To see how QKD is possible, we give a brief
outline of the BB84 protocol, one of the first QKD protocols, named after its
creators and the year of its invention [BB84].
The BB84 protocol
The BB84 protocol, as well as most other QKD protocols, are broken down into
two steps. In the first, Alice sends quantum signals to Bob. In the second, Alice
and Bob communicate classically in order to perform some post-processing on
their measurement outcomes.
In the first step, Alice randomly chooses one of four states given by the
eigenstates of the Pauli operators σx or σz. The states are grouped into two
bases, one for each Pauli operator. In the z basis the states are |0〉, and |1〉,
while the states in the x basis are |0x〉 = 1/
√
2(|0〉+ |1〉), and |1x〉 = 1/
√
2(|0〉−
|1〉). Bob then either chooses a projective measurement that unambiguously
discriminates between the states in the x basis or in the z basis. For example,
in the z basis, Bob’s measurement operators are |0〉〈0| and |1〉〈1|. If Bob chooses
the same basis Alice chose, then Bob determines the bit value (either 0 or 1)
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that Alice wanted to send him. If Bob chooses the basis Alice did not choose,
he will measure a random bit.
In the second step, after Bob measures the signals sent by Alice, Bob reveals
the basis he measured in for each signal. Alice then tells him when he measured
in a different basis, in which case they throw away that bit value. When Bob
measured in the same basis they keep that bit value. The security of the protocol
lies in the fact that Eve does not know beforehand which basis Alice has chosen
to send the signals in. This means Eve cannot discriminate between all four
possible states Alice could have sent.
Alice and Bob share a small portion of their measurement results with each
other in order to estimate how many errors are introduced in the communication
of their signals. If Alice and Bob determine that their estimated error rate is
below a certain threshold, they proceed with the protocol. Otherwise, they abort
the protocol because the large amount of errors implies that an eavesdropper
may have tried to gain lots of information about the quantum signals. If the
error rate is low enough, Alice and Bob continue with two post-processing steps.
First there is error correction, to remove any errors that differ between Alice
and Bob’s keys. Then they perform privacy amplification, which shortens the
length of their key in order to remove any information the eavesdropper may
have on the key.
Now that we have outlined the two phases of the BB84 protocol, we now
discuss the security of QKD protocols, including the BB84 protocol.
Proving Security
It is important to note that the desired security of the BB84 protocol, as well
as other QKD protocols, is what is called ”unconditional”. This means that de-
spite the eavesdropper being able to do anything allowed by quantum mechanics,
Alice and Bob can still perform QKD and form a secret key. In addition, an
eavesdropper will never be able to determine the key any time in the future, as
long as the key is used in a smart way (for example, using the one time pad).
This is quite different from the security claims of classical cryptographic proto-
cols. Classical cryptography claims of security usually depend upon assumptions
about the difficulty of a mathematical problem, and on the computational power
or memory capacity of an eavesdropper. In addition, some of the problems that
are assumed to be difficult, are not difficult for quantum computers. If large-
scale quantum computing becomes possible, then these cryptography protocols
are no longer viable. However, QKD is robust against (the existence of) quan-
tum computers, and is still secure. The security claims in QKD are stronger
as well, because they only depend upon two things: the validity of quantum
mechanics, and that the protocol is performed exactly as outlined in the secu-
rity proof. For more details on the comparison of QKD to other cryptography
methods, see [SML09].
In order to prove security for a given QKD protocol, a model is assumed to
describe the different components used in the protocol. For example, a source
of photons may be assumed to output only single photons. Also, an assumption
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may be made about the eavesdropper, to limit her output to Bob’s detector as
being only single photons. Then Bob’s measurement description is only required
for the single photon and vacuum subspace, since these are the only signals he
receives. The assumption that simple systems are used and measured greatly
simplifies proving security. If these assumptions are not made, security proofs
for QKD protocols become extremely difficult. This is also true of quantum
communication in general: unless simple systems are assumed in a theory, it


















Figure 1.2: Above: A model of a quantum communication protocol. It has
a source that outputs qubits, which go through a quantum channel that out-
puts qubits to a measurement. Below: An experimental implementation of the
modelled quantum communication protocol. A source outputs optical modes
which then go through a quantum channel that outputs optical modes to a
measurement.
However, any assumptions made about a quantum communication or QKD
protocol in theory are not necessarily valid in its experimental implementation
(see Fig. 1.1.1. For example, current technology only allows for approximate
sources of single photons. Usually these sources output single photons or the
vacuum. However, they also have a small probability of outputting multi-photon
signals. One example of an experimental photon source is weak laser pulses,
which are formed by a weakly powered laser that outputs a Poissonian distri-
bution for the output number of photons. This means usually no photon (the
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vacuum) is created, sometimes a single photon is created, and with a small prob-
ability more photons are output. Another example of a single photon source
is parametric down conversion (PDC). In PDC a laser shines on a nonlinear
crystal producing the vacuum most of the time, two photons some of the time,
and a higher number of photon pairs occasionally. The pairs of photons emitted
are spatially separated, and so a detector is used to measure when photons are
emitted on one of the spacial outputs. When this detector fires, it means that
one or more photons were emitted in the other spacial mode. The signals from
this other spacial mode are used as an approximation of a single photon source.
In addition, Eve is not restricted to sending Bob single photons. She should
be allowed to send any optical signal she likes. This, combined with imperfect
single photon sources, creates a different description of the protocol from what
is required in a QKD security proof. Therefore, it is important to be able to
connect the security proof that assumes a simple description to the more realistic
experimental implementation. One approach would be to do another security
proof using a more realistic model for the source and the detector. Consider the
scenario where a weak laser is used as an approximate source of single photons.








where α is a positive constant, and n is the photon number. Since the sum is
over all photon numbers, this state is in an infinite dimensional Hilbert space.
This makes a new security proof taking an infinite dimensional Hilbert space
into account a challenging task. Instead, it would be convenient to be able to
use one or more theoretical tools to say that the security proof that assumes
the use of simple systems can also apply to the more realistic experimental
implementation.
One tool used to connect security proofs with more complicated implemen-
tations is called tagging [Lüt99a, Lüt00]. More specifically, tagging connects an
experimental source that may be complicated to a theoretical small-dimensional
source. To illustrate how tagging works, consider the weak laser source that
outputs coherent states (Eqn. 1.1). Suppose that we would like a single photon
output from a source for a QKD security proof. Then, when a multi-photon
signal is created we assume that a complete classical description of the output
state is forwarded to Eve. In the BB84 protocol this means that Eve would dis-
cover which basis and bit value Alice has sent, and hence does not introduce any
errors in trying to learn information about these signals. Therefore any errors
that Eve may introduce by trying to learn the signals are all attributed to the
single photon signals sent by the source. Taking into account the probability
that single photon signals are created allows the error rate for the single photon
contributions to be rescaled, and hence increased. Therefore, under the tagging
argument, we take a pessimistic view that ensures that Eve does not get an
advantage by exploiting multi-photon signals from the source. This means that
the simple security proof may be applied to the scenario when there is a source
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with multi-photon contributions.
It would also be desirable to make a similar argument to remove the as-
sumption that Eve sends single photons to Bob. This is one of the goals of
this thesis: to show that a theoretical tool exists that can connect simple mea-
surement descriptions with a more realistic, experimental description. In QKD,
this has been an assumption that has been made in many security proofs (cf.
[GLLP04]) where a model exists in which Eve is forced to restrict her output to
a single photon. This thesis will verify under which conditions this model holds.
Moreover, this model is not restricted to QKD, it has many other applications
in quantum communication, as will be demonstrated.
1.1.2 Entanglement Verification
The assumption that single photons are measured at a detector has not only
been made in QKD, but is also made in an area of quantum communication
called entanglement verification. Entangled states are a critical resource for
many quantum communication protocols, and so it is important to be able to
verify that entangled states are indeed created in an experiment. The goal of
entanglement verification is to be able to say whether or not a given state is
entangled. There are various tests that can be used to verify entanglement,
such as Bell inequalities [Bel64]. Entanglement can also be verified by state
tomography where a set of measurements are performed in order to completely
determine the state. The state can then be checked against necessary and
sufficient conditions to verify if the state is entangled.
Here we focus on state tomography, in order to simplify our analysis. In
order to do tomography, a particular set of measurements must be performed.
We use a positive operator valued measure (POVM) to describe the measure-
ment, which has noncommuting POVM elements. For tomography the POVM
elements must form an operator basis for the Hilbert space of the entangled
state. A reconstruction technique is then performed using the measurement
results to reconstruct the state. For example there is the inversion of Born’s
rule, and maximum likelihood estimation [Hra97]. The inversion of Born’s rule
is inverting the linear constraints given by the expectation values obtained from










the POVM elements for the measurements on the two photons. The method of
maximum likelihood estimation finds a state that is most likely to come from
the measurement data. However, an additional assumption about the dimension
of the input space must be made in order to use this method effectively.
Regardless of the reconstruction technique, if the reconstructed state is en-
tangled, then entanglement of the source’s state is verified.
As an example, entanglement verification of polarized photons is typically
done by having a PDC source that outputs entangled two-photon states, and
each photon is measured with a separate measurement device. However, the
PDC source may output states with more than two photons. In this case it may
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be assumed that some of the measurement results come from the tomography of
a two-photon entangled state, but in fact come from a higher-dimensional state
output by the PDC source. The question arises then: if the state lives in a higher
dimensional Hilbert space than that considered in the reconstruction technique,
is entanglement still verified? The answer to this question involves a similar
model to that used in QKD considered previously. If this model exists, then
entanglement verification of a simplified description also implies entanglement
is verified for a larger dimensional description. In this thesis we will show under
what conditions this model exists.
1.2 Contributions
In Chapter 2 we describe a “squashing” model for a measurement on a large
Hilbert space. This large measurement is modelled by a physical map followed
by a measurement on a small Hilbert space. This is a convenient decomposition
because the map and simplified measurement do not need to be implemented
experimentally, they are only a theoretical equivalent to the large measure-
ment. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions to determine whether a
squashing model exists. The implication of having such a model in a quantum
communication protocol is as follows. If a squashing model exists for a measure-
ment used in a quantum communication protocol’s implementation, then it is
valid to assume that the measurement has a small dimensional description. In
the context of QKD, the existence of a squashing model means that a security
proof that requires single photons or qubits to be measured also apply to the
QKD protocol’s full optical implementation. In the context of other quantum
communication protocols, the squashing model allows theories that require mea-
surements to be performed on small dimensional systems to also apply to the
full optical implementation of these protocols.
In addition, we consider several examples of detectors used in quantum com-
munication, and in particular QKD, to determine whether a squashing model
exists for them. We provide a method in order to always find a squashing
model between any two measurements, given some conditions. We also use
the squashing model formalism to determine if multiple time modes, as well as
multi-photon signals can be reduced to a single time mode single photon sig-
nal. We consider how to deal with imperfections such as inefficiencies and dark
counts in the context of the squashing model.
The work on the squashing model in Chapter 2 was done in collaboration
with Tobias Moroder and Norbert Lütkenhaus. The details of this work are
contained in the papers [BML08, BML09].
In Chapter 3 we show how the squashing model introduced in Chapter 2
applies to entanglement verification. In particular, we present necessary and
sufficient conditions under which a squashing model exists for entanglement
verification. These conditions are similar to those in Chapter 2, except the
physical map need not be physical in the context of entanglement, it is only
required to be positive. We reference a proposition that allows an alternative
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way from the formalism developed in Chapter 2 to find a squashing model in
the context of entanglement verification: if tomography is performed in the
small dimensional measurement of the squashing model, then the squashing
model exists if and only if the set of states compatible with the outcomes of the
large dimensional measurement are contained within the same set for the small
dimensional measurement [MGB+09]. We use this proposition to show how a
measurement used for tomography of polarized single photons has a squashing
model for entanglement verification, even though it does not have a squashing
model in the context of Chapter 2.
The work on the squashing model used for entanglement verification in Chap-
ter 3 was done in collaboration with Tobias Moroder, Otfried Gühne, Marco






Quantum communication protocols typically require that single photons are
measured at one or more measurements. However, many implementations of
quantum communication protocols do not achieve this. For example, a source
may occasionally output multiple photons, and then measurements are per-
formed on its output. In QKD the eavesdropper, Eve, is not restricted to
sending single photons to the receiver, Bob, she can send any signal with any
number of photons (i.e.states in a Fock space). These photons can also be sent
using whatever optical modes Eve would like. For example, she can change the
frequency, polarization, or relative phase of the photons she sends. In QKD,
it has been assumed that there exists a model that equates a measurement on
optical modes to one that is first preceded by a map that reduces (squashes)
the incoming signal to a single photon or the vacuum. The output of this map
is input to the same measurement, but now on a low-dimensional Hilbert space
[GLLP04]. As an example, there is the measurement performed in the polar-
ization implementation of the BB84 protocol [BB84], where the input goes to
a polarizing beam splitter that can be set to separate in one of two bases: ei-
ther the horizontal/vertical basis (labelled as z) or the +45/-45 degree basis
(labelled as x) (see Fig. 2.1). At the end of each arm of the polarizing beam
splitter there is a threshold photodetector that cannot resolve the number of
incoming photons. If a random choice of basis is done with fixed probabilities,
then this measurement can be described by a single POVM with noncommuting
POVM elements. This detector has been assumed to have a squashing model,
such as in the important simulation [MFL07].
This chapter will specify how to determine whether such a squashing map
exists. However, the goal of the squashing model is more general. It is to reduce
any large-dimensional measurement to a corresponding small-dimensional one.
This provides a powerful tool that can be used to simplify the analysis of optical









Figure 2.1: The BB84 measurement with an active basis choice. The input goes
into a polarization rotator that Bob sets to choose the basis (x or z) he would
like to measure. Next there is a polarizing beam splitter that splits between
two orthogonal polarization modes, followed by two threshold detectors, which
cannot resolve the incident photon number. Bob associates a bit value with
each threshold detector, so when one clicks, he records the corresponding bit
value.
Also, in the context of QKD, one typically assumes the calibrated device
scenario in which the detection device is trusted and known. This means that
the eavesdropper does not get any information from the measurement device,
and Bob has complete control over its settings (for example, the basis he would
like to measure). In addition, Bob knows the POVM elements that accurately
describe his measurement. This is required in order to find a squashing model,
because it depends on the structure of the measurement performed. Then if a
squashing model exists, the corresponding squashing map can become part of the
eavesdropper’s (Eve’s) attack, since it occurs right before Bob’s measurement.
This means that Eve can do whatever attack allowed by quantum mechanics,
but at the end of her attack there is the fixed squashing map, which reduces
her output signal to a single photon or the vacuum, which is forwarded to Bob.
Therefore the existence of the squashing model validates the assumption that,
without loss of generality, Eve sends a signal in a qubit and vacuum Hilbert
space to the receiver, Bob.
As an example, many security proofs of QKD protocols assume that Eve
forwards polarized single photons (qubits) or vacuum states to the receiver. If
a given full optical implementation of a polarization measurement used by Bob
has a squashing model connecting it to the single photon polarization measure-
ment assumed in the security proof, then this proof is also valid for the full
optical implementation of the protocol. Note that our result has implications
for measurements beyond those used in QKD, for example, in entanglement
verification (Chapter 3), and others (Section 2.8).
Additionally, squashing the detection to a finite-dimensional system from a
large- or infinite-dimensional system makes it possible to use the fast converging
de Finetti theorems of Renner [Ren07] on the level of the squashed system. In
QKD this implies that Eve’s attack can be assumed, without loss of generality,
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to be simpler than the most general attack she could do. More specifically, she
is restricted in applying a collective attack. This means that Eve attacks each
signal identically, but she does not need to measure any systems she uses for
her attack until a time in the future of her choosing. For a recent review of
QKD, including the different classes of attacks Eve can perform that have been
studied in the literature, see [SBPC+].
First, in Section 2.2 we define a squashing model more precisely and describe
a formalism to find whether a squashing model exists given a realistic model
for the detector, and a simplified, desired description. Then, in Section 2.3 we
discuss the reduction of the squashing map to finite dimensions. We use this
reduction to apply the formalism to examples of detectors commonly used in
quantum communication to find if they have squashing models. In Section 2.4
we show that any detector has a squashing model, as long as enough noise is
added to the incoming signals and the measurement. Section 2.5 generalizes the
examples considered previously to give a squashing map which takes a multi-
mode input to a single mode input. In Section 2.6 we consider imperfections
such as inefficiencies and dark counts in the context of the squashing model.
Next, Section 2.7 discusses some numerical results that either shows there is
not a squashing model for certain examples, or suggests that one may exist.
Finally, we present how the squashing model is useful in other quantum com-
munication applications (Section 2.8), and some interesting continuations of the
squashing model (Section 2.9).
2.2 Formalism
In this section, we provide the description of a formalism that is used throughout
this thesis. We begin by defining a squashing model more precisely.
2.2.1 Definition of a Squashing Model
Consider a given experimental setup made up of two parts: a known physical
measurement, whose output goes into a post-processing on the raw detection
events output by the physical measurement. Together, the physical measure-
ment and the post-processing, we call the full measurement. We would like to
equate this measurement to a given small-dimensional measurement, which we
call the target measurement. Then a squashing model is the representation of
this high-dimensional full measurement, FM , and a squashing map, Λ, followed
by the low-dimensional target measurement, FQ (see Fig. 2.2). Throughout this
thesis, the letter F is used to represent a POVM element. The subscript M cor-
responds to the full measurement, and stands for “mode”, while Q corresponds
to the target measurement, and stands for “qubit” (although this measurement
may be on any small-dimensional Hilbert space, and not necessarily a qubit).
The POVM elements FM are in the Hilbert space HM and the POVM elements
FQ are in the Hilbert space HQ.
The classical post-processing performed after the full measurement may be
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desired due to the quantum communication protocol being performed, and is
hence included in the squashing model. Alternatively, there may be events that
occur in the full measurement that do not correspond to events in the target
measurement. In order to deal with these extra events, they are assigned in a
particular way to one or more of the valid outcomes of the small-dimensional
measurement.
In the squashing model, it is required that the model (the map and the target
measurement) and the full measurement are statistically equivalent. In other
words, the probability of any outcome of the measurement FM for any input
is the same as the probability of any outcome of the measurement FQ when it
is preceded by a specific squashing map. If a squashing map exists such that
this condition holds, then the full measurement FM has a squashing model with




























(Large Space) (Small Space)
Figure 2.2: The full measurement FM (above) has a general optical input ρin,
which is first measured by a receiver’s physical detector B, followed by classical
post-processing. The squashed measurement (below) has the same general op-
tical input ρin, which is then squashed by a map Λ to a smaller Hilbert space,
followed by the target measurement FQ, which consists of a physical measure-
ment B′ (that may be different from B) followed by a classical post-processsing.
It is required that both of these measurements produce the same output statis-
tics for all ρin.
The existence of a squashing model connecting a given fixed full measurement
and target measurement depends on the existence of a squashing map that
precedes the target measurement. A physical map that does this must be a
trace-preserving completely positive map, Λ. We can formulate the restriction





















where ρin is the density matrix of the incoming signal, i corresponds to each
detection event, and Λ† is the dual, or adjoint, squashing map. The adjoint map
is also completely positive, but is not necessarily trace-preserving. However, it
is unital, which means that it maps the identity operator on the space HM to
the identity operator on the space HQ. It is required that this restriction holds





Λ† CP and Unital.
(2.2)
Since Λ was a trace preserving map, Λ† must be a unital map. This means that
it maps the identity operator on the target space 1Q to the identity operator on
the full space 1M . Now we have the adjoint squashing map taking the target
measurement operators to the corresponding full measurement operators. Note
that the unital condition is already contained in the first condition of Eqn. (2.2)










2.2.2 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
Here we reformulate the problem using the Choi-Jamio lkowski isomorphism
[Jam72, BZ06, dP67, Cho82] in order to apply the conditions given in Eqn. (2.2).
It provides an isomorphism from the map Λ† to a positive semidefinite operator
τ , which maps the Hilbert space HQQ′ to the space HMQ′ . Here the Hilbert
space HQ′ is the same dimension as HQ, but has a prime to denote it as a
separate space. τ is constructed by applying the adjoint squashing map to half
of an unnormalized maximally entangled state |ψ+〉 =
∑d
i=1 |i〉Q|i〉Q′ , where
d = dim(Q), namely τ = Λ†⊗ id (|ψ+〉〈ψ+|). It is useful to be able to represent
the linear constraints Eqn. (2.2) using a different form of the Choi-Jamio lkowski
map τ , called the transfer matrix, which is denoted as τR. This is a reordering
of the coefficients in its matrix representation via 〈k, k′|τR|l, l′〉 = 〈k, l|τ |k′, l′〉.
The search for a squashing model for a full measurement FM with respect to a
target measurement FQ was first contained in solving the constraints Eqn. (2.2).
We can now reformulate the problem as the search for the matrix τ correspond-
ing to the adjoint squashing map Λ† under the constraints:
τR|F (i)Q 〉〉 = |F
(i)
M 〉〉, (2.3a)
〈k, k′|τR|l, l′〉 = 〈k, l|τ |k′, l′〉, (2.3b)
τ † = τ ≥ 0. (2.3c)
Here we introduce the vector notation of an operator, V =
∑
i,j vi,j |i〉〈j|, as
|V 〉〉 =
∑
i,j vi,j |i〉|j〉. This allows us to write |Λ†(V )〉〉 = τR|V 〉〉 [BZ06].
Overall, we have reformulated the search for a suitable squashing operation
as the search for a positive semidefinite operator τ ≥ 0 that satisfies a fixed
number of linear constraints (Eqn. 2.3a). We will show how these can be solved
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analytically in Section 2.3. They can also be efficiently solved via convex op-
timization; searching for completely positive maps using these techniques has
been shown, for example, in [RW05, FSW07].
2.2.3 Reduction
To find a squashing model, it is important to be able to reduce the infinite
Hilbert space of the input signals to a finite one in order to solve the constraints
Eqns. (2.3a). To do this, we break up the squashing map into two components.
First there is a map that reduces the full Hilbert space HM to finite dimensions.
Second, a map takes the finite Hilbert space, to the desired target measurement
space HQ. In addition, we would like to remove the vacuum component of the
squashing map in order to reduce the dimension of the space HQ that we need
to consider for the target measurement. This will simplify the search for the
squashing map.
For the first part of the squashing map we use the fact that typical photode-
tectors have POVM elements that are block diagonal with respect to the number
of incoming photons. This means that there is no loss or gain of photons within
the detector. Of course, real detectors have loss as well as other inefficiencies,
but we deal with these issues in Section 2.6. If the POVM elements are block
diagonal, then the measurement can be preceded by a quantum non-demolition
(QND) measurement of the total photon number, without loss of generality.
The output of the QND measurement is a finite dimensional Hilbert subspace
(which we denote as HnM ) that increases as the number of incoming photons (n)
increases. The squashing map is now decomposed into first a QND measure-
ment of the incoming photon number, followed by a squashing map that takes
the space HnM into the target space HQ (for example, see Fig. 2.3).
To further reduce the Hilbert space involved in the second part of the squash-
ing map, we can break the vacuum component off from the rest of the squashing
map. To do this, we note that the full and target measurements typically have a
vacuum projection as one POVM element, and no vacuum component in any of
the others. Also, if the outcome of the QND measurement is 0, then the second
part of the squashing map is trivial: the squashing map forwards the vacuum
to the target measurement. Therefore, when the QND measurement receives a
0 outcome, it forwards a classical message to Bob, to tell him he received the
vacuum. This is what is called a “flag”. Now the space HQ does not contain
the vacuum component, which simplifies the analysis that follows.
Now all that is left to find is a squashing map for each finite-dimensional
photon number subspace HnM to the target measurement input space HQ using
Eqns. (2.3).
The dimension of HnM , the output of the QND measurement, is different
for each photon number n. To solve the linear constraints Eqns. (2.3a), it
would be convenient to have a fixed finite dimension for each photon number
subspace. However, the specific POVM elements are required to find this fixed
finite dimension, and so it will be found for each of the examples below.
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2.3 Examples: Analytic Solutions
In this section we discuss two examples of detector setups used in quantum
communication that detect the polarization of photons: the measurement that
is performed in the BB84 protocol, and the measurement performed in the
six-state protocol. These two measurements considered here have an active
basis choice, i.e.the basis measured is actively chosen by an input Bob puts
into his detector. We investigate whether there exists a squashing model for
these measurements. The full measurement is one that accepts any number of
photons in the Hilbert space HM of two orthogonal polarization modes and the
vacuum. The target measurement is the same setup as the full measurement,
but it only accepts single photons, also in two orthogonal polarization modes
and the vacuum, HQ. Note that both of these measurements are of the form
discussed above, where the vacuum component can be split off as a flag, and
each photon number subspace can be dealt with separately. As such, in this
section we search for a squashing map for each fixed input number of photons
n to a single photon.
2.3.1 BB84 Active Basis Choice
Here we consider the polarization measurement performed for the BB84 protocol
as described previously (see Fig. 2.1). Note that when multiple photons are
input to this detector, then double clicks can occur (i.e.both threshold detectors
fire at the same time). In this case a classical post-processing of these events
is chosen. Double clicks are random assigned to one of the single click events
(0 or 1). This means that whenever both detectors fire at the same time,
instead of recording this event, one of either 0 or 1 will be randomly recorded
by Bob’s device. One reason why this post-processing is done, is so that the
full and target measurements have the same number of outcomes, and therefore
the linear constraints Eqn. (2.3a) can be satisfied for every event, indexed by
i. Another reason this post-processing is used, is for the security of QKD (see
[Lüt99b]).
To derive the squashing map for the BB84 measurement with an active
basis choice, we first perform another reduction of the Hilbert space of interest,
which takes advantage of the specific form of the POVM elements. The full










where α ∈ {x, z} is a label for the basis choice of the polarizing beamsplitter,
b ∈ {0, 1} corresponds to the “0” or “1” outcome of the detector, and |l, k〉α
is a two-mode Fock state with photon numbers l and k with respect to the
polarization mode basis α. Here n is fixed, while b and α determine the POVM
element in that space.
It is important to note that the dimension of the Hilbert spaceHnM is variable
with the photon number. The standard basis for the space of two orthogonal
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polarization modes is given by {|n− i, i〉}, i = 0..n. This means that HnM is
n + 1-dimensional. This means for large n that solving the conditions given
in Eqn. (2.3a) would be difficult, as the dimension of HnM is very large. In
addition, we have to solve many of these constraints separately for each fixed
n. Therefore, it would be convenient to reduce the incoming Hilbert space
dimension to a fixed finite value for all photon numbers n, so that the linear
constraints Eqn. (2.3a) can be solved for all photon numbers simultaneously.
To reduce the Hilbert space further we find a projection onto a subspace P ,
spanned by the four states {|n, 0〉x, |0, n〉x, |n, 0〉z, |0, n〉z}, and its orthogonal
complement P⊥, which is n− 3-dimensional (since P is 4 dimensional, and the
full n photon space is n + 1 dimensional). This particular projection is chosen
because the single click POVM elements are the projections onto the states in
P . This means that states in the space P⊥ will never trigger a single click event,
regardless of the basis measured; it will only ever trigger a double click. Since
the post-processing is defined to take double clicks to a random bit value, the
squashing map on the space P⊥ is clear: the squashing map ignores the input
and outputs a mixed qubit state 1Q/2, since this will trigger a random bit value
in the target measurement.
The projection map can follow directly after the QND measurement of the
photon number in the squashing map, and before the target detector. This
projection can be done without loss of generality because it commutes with
the measurement operators (see Fig. 2.3). Applying this projection has two
advantages: the squashing map in P⊥ is trivial, and then all that is left to find






















Figure 2.3: Reduction of the squashing map for the BB84 protocol detector.
The squashing map can be modelled as a photon number measurement followed
by a projection measurement onto a 4-dimensional subspace. Depending on
the outcome of these measurements, the squashing map either proceeds with a
low-dimensional squashing operation ΛPn or outputs a completely mixed qubit
state.
We could continue to directly find the squashing map for n photons in the
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subspace P via the constraints given in Eqn. 2.3. However we can employ
an additional analytic tool (described below) to simplify the proof. For an
alternative proof that is more direct and that demonstrates an approach to
finding squashing models that is more general, see Appendix 4.1.
To find a squashing map for the subspace P and a given photon number n,
we first decompose the adjoint squashing map into τn,P = τfix + τopen, where
τfix is a fixed matrix of known entries given by the linear constraints and τopen
contains any and all open parameters that need to be determined such that
τn,P ≥ 0. To determine τfix we can use the definition of the adjoint squashing
map given previously as τ = Λ† ⊗ id (|ψ+〉〈ψ+|). Here we may write the input
operator |ψ+〉〈ψ+| in the basis given by {F (i)Q ⊗ σj}, where the σj are the Pauli
operators and the F (i)Q are unnormalized. We also define F
(y)
Q as the third basis
choice measurement performed in the six-state protocol described below. We
simply use this operator as part of the operator basis, it does not have any

















This decomposition has the advantage that the adjoint map Λ† can be applied
directly to the first subsystem by using the substitution F (i)Q 7→ F
(i)
M , i = x, z
which is clear from the linear constraints on the adjoint squashing map. Also


















Since the linear constraints do not give any information about the mapping of
F
(y)
Q , this leaves τopen = D ⊗ σy, where the operator D is undetermined. To
determine D, we need to impose the second condition τn,P ≥ 0.
The case n = 1 trivially has a squashing map. For n = 2, the squashing
map can be found easily using the direct method found in Appendix 4.1. For
n ≥ 3, we can solve all together at the same time. However, there is a problem
in doing this, namely that F (0,α)M − F
(1,α)
M has a different form if n is even
or odd. To circumvent this, we use an additional analytic tool to represent
τn,P in a different way. We use the basis |φi, j〉 = |φi〉 ⊗ |j〉, where |φi〉 ∈
{|n, 0〉z, |0, n〉z, |n, 0〉x, |0, n〉x}, and |j〉 ∈ {|0〉, |1〉} is the standard basis for the
qubit space, to define the matrix T (τn,P ) as
Tij,kl(τn,P ) = 〈φi, j|τn,P |φi, j〉. (2.5)
This relation can be rewritten using the congruence transformationG, T (τn,P ) =
Gτn,PG
†. According to Sylvester’s law of inertia, the number of positive, nega-
tive and zero eigenvalues are the same in T and τn,P if and only if G is nonsin-
gular [HJ85]. Since the set of states |φi, j〉 are linearly independent, then G is
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nonsingular. Therefore, to verify the positivity of τn,P it is sufficient to check
the positivity of T .
Clearly the transformation in Eqn. 2.5 is linear, and so T (τn,P ) = T (τfix) +
T (τopen). First consider T (τopen), which can be broken down into TP (D)⊗ σy,
where TP is the transformation on the subspace P . Note that since T (τfix)
only has real entries, the open entries in T (τopen) must also be real (if there was
a complex solution, its conjugate would also be a solution, and these could be
added to produce a real solution). In order for TP (D) ⊗ σy to be real, TP (D)
is of the form iS where S is a real skew-symmetric matrix. For convenience




0 δ 2ν −2ν
−δ 0 −2ν ±2ν
−2ν 2ν 0 −δ
2ν ∓2ν δ 0
 + i

0 x1 x2 x3
−x1 0 x4 x5
−x2 −x4 0 x6
−x3 −x5 −x6 0
 ,
where we define ν = 2−n/2, δ(n, ν) = ν2(1 − (−1)n), and xi, i = 1..6 are open
parameters. To find the open parameters such that T (τn,P ) ≥ 0, consider
T (τn,P ) written explicitly as:

1 0 0 2δ + x1 ν ν + x2 ν −ν + x3
0 0 −x1 0 −x2 0 −x3 0
0 −x1 0 0 0 x4 0 x5
2δ + x1 0 0 1 ν − x4 ν −x5 ±ν
ν −x2 0 ν − x4 1/2 1/2 δ −δ + x6
ν + x2 0 x4 ν 1/2 1/2 δ − x6 −δ
ν −x3 0 ∓ν − x5 δ δ − x6 1/2 −1/2




All that is left to find are the open parameters xi. Each subdeterminant
of T (τn,P ) must be non-negative in order for the adjoint squashing map to be
positive semidefinite. Therefore, consider the 2 by 2 submatrices specified by
their diagonal entries (where 1 is the top left of the matrix Eqn. (2.6)): (2,3),
(2,5), (2,7), (3,6), (3,8). The determinants of these matrices must be positive
giving −x2i ≥ 0, i = 1..5, and so these open parameters are 0. Considering the
3 by 3 subdeterminant (5,6,8) if n is even and the (6,7,8) subdeterminant for n
odd gives x6 = 0. The eigenvalues of the resulting fixed matrix T (τn,P ) can be
analytically computed, and are found to be non-negative.
This implies that the complete squashing map for the BB84 active basis
detector exists, since τ is positive semidefinite and satisfies the linear constraints.
This squashing map has been found also by Tsurumaru and Tamaki [TT08].
The squashing model then generalizes a qubit-based security proof of the BB84
protocol to one that accepts any number of photons. This is also useful in
other quantum communication contexts that use this same detector, since the
squashing model depends on the detector and not on the method of its use.
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2.3.2 Six-State Active Basis Choice
The six-state measurement is the same as the BB84 measurement, except there is
a third setting to the polarizing beam splitter which splits photons according to a
circular basis (labelled as y). The post-processing of double click events is again
randomly assigned to either single detection events. For this detector, we have
similar measurement operators as before in Eqn. (2.4), but with α ∈ {x, y, z}, as
well as performing a renormalization. In this case, the operator τ that represents
the squashing map is completely determined by the linear constraints since the
measurement operators FQ form a complete basis for their Hilbert space.
However, it can be easily seen that the squashing map does not exist,
since τ  0, as follows. First, we can write the adjoint squashing map τ =
Λ†⊗ id(|ψ+〉〈ψ+|) as before. Since the qubit measurements of the six-state pro-
tocol are complete, the input operator |ψ+〉〈ψ+| can be expanded into the basis

















As in the BB84 case, we can directly apply Λ† to the first subsystem by using
the substitution F (i)Q 7→ F
(i)
M . The operator τ has negative eigenvalues, starting





|3, 0〉Mz ⊗ |1〉Q′ − |0, 3〉Mz ⊗ |0〉Q′
)
, (2.7)
is sufficient to show that τ  0, where |0〉Q′ and |1〉Q′ are canonical orthogonal
basis states. We find 〈θ−|τ |θ−〉 = −1/4, and so this proves that a squashing map
for the six-state protocol with active basis choice does not exist. This implies
that a security proof of the six-state protocol cannot be generalized using the
squashing model, and another method is required to prove security for the full
optical implementation of this protocol.
2.4 How to Always Find a Squashing Map
The examples above show how solving the Eqns. (2.3) will determine whether
a given full detection has a squashing map with respect to a target detector.
In this section, we consider the case where the Eqns. (2.3) cannot be satisfied.
However, all hope it not lost in finding a squashing model between a full and
target measurement. There are two methods to recover the squashing model,
but at the cost of changing the full measurement. Either noise is introduced
via the classical post-processing or the physical detection setup is modified in
an intelligible way. A similar approach of implementing non-positive maps has
been introduced before in [Hor01].
First, we begin by discussing problems trying to satisfy the linear constraints
Eqn. (2.3a). To solve the linear constraints, we require that the full and target
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measurement have the same number of outcomes. However, if the full measure-
ment’s physical measurement has more outcomes than the target measurement
(as we saw with the above examples), then a classical post-processing should
be done on the outcomes of the full measurement. It will reduce the number of
full measurement outcomes to that of the target measurement. Also, we require
that any linear dependence in the POVM elements of the full measurement is
the same in the POVM elements of the target measurement. This enables the
linear constraints to be satisfied, because for each index i there is a one to
one correspondence between full and target POVM elements, and none of these
equations contradict any others, because there are no linear dependencies that
are not both satisfied by full and target POVM elements. Now that the linear
constraints are satisfied, we consider the positivity of the squashing map, τ .
If there are any open parameters left in τ after solving the linear constraints,
then they should be chosen such that τ is positive semidefinite. If this is possible,
then the full measurement has a squashing model with respect to the target
measurement. Otherwise, we would like to construct a new adjoint squashing
map τnew that is positive semi-definite, and as a result, we must also change
the full measurement operators. Using the adjoint squashing map that satisfies
the linear constraints τ (which we relabel here for clarity as τold):
τnew = pτold + (1− p)τ+, (2.8)
where p is a weight in the interval [0, 1], and τ+ is a unital map and τ+ ≥
0. Note that the construction of τnew is convex, and therefore there exists a
p, and choices for any open parameters left in τold such that τnew is positive
semidefinite. In addition, the squashing map can be thought of as a stochastic
process: with probability p the squashing map whose adjoint is τold is applied,
and with probability 1− p the squashing map whose adjoint is τ+ is applied.
Since the squashing map has been changed, we must also modify the full
measurement. The new full measurement operators are the combination of the
POVM F (i)M with weight (1− p) and τR+ |F
(i)
Q 〉〉 with weight p. This is necessary
so that a squashing map exists to the desired target measurement:
τRnew|F
(i)
Q 〉〉 = p|F
(i)





Note that here we apply the realignment R to use Eqn. 2.8 (which is linear) to
determine how τRnew acts on |F
(i)
Q 〉〉.
The important point here is that any full detector can have a squashing
model with respect to any target measurement as long as:
1. The full measurement and target measurement have the same number of
outcomes.
2. Any linear dependencies with the POVM elements of the full measurement
are identical to the linear dependencies in the target measurement POVM.
3. The full measurement is modified to be that of Eqn. (2.9), where p is
suitably chosen.
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There are two ways in which we can modify the full measurement operators
according to Eqn. 2.9: add noise through classical post-processing or modify the
physical full measurement.
The first method is to apply a classical post-processing to the outcome of
the full measurement to add noise to the outcomes of the physical detector. For
example, in the six-state protocol with an active basis choice, the 0 and 1 out-
comes could be kept with probability q and have the bit flipped with probability
1 − q. If q = 1/2 the post-processing ignores its input from the detector, and
randomly chooses 0 or 1. In this case there is a squashing map that ignores
the input and outputs a maximally mixed state 1Q/2. Therefore, there is al-
ways a choice of q such that a squashing map exists. For the six-state protocol,
the maximal q (and so the minimal noise introduced) is 16.67%. This bound
was found using a semidefinite program [FSW07] that searches for a positive
semidefinite squashing map that satisfies the linear constraints, while minimiz-
ing the noise parameter 1 − q. For more details on finding squashing maps in
a numerical way, see Section 2.7. The bound of 16.67% is beyond the maximal
tolerable error rate for QKD to be performed (with one way classical communi-
cation) [KGR04]. Therefore, in this case, noisy classical post-processing is not
a good solution to the problem of finding a squashing map. However, in other
contexts, this solution may be helpful.
Another method to find a squashing map is to modify the physical measure-
ment device. We present a specific example of how to do this, with a choice for
p and τ+ from Eqn. (2.8) that is easily implemented experimentally.
2.4.1 Experimental Measurement that Always Has a Squash-
ing Map
First we require K copies of the measurement FM , which can be placed at each
end of a beamsplitter that equally distributes input to its K output arms. If
all of the photons arrive to the detector in a single arm, then the measurement
is the same as before. Otherwise a post-processing is performed, where the
result is assigned (according to a probability distribution) to one of the possible
outcomes of FM .
Now we find the corresponding squashing map τnew that accompanies this
new measurement. As we have seen before in Section 2.2.3, as long as the full
measurement POVM elements are block diagonal with respect to the photon
number, the squashing map can be preceded by a QND measurement of the num-
ber of incoming photons. Then in each n-photon subspace the squashing map
can be thought of as a stochastic process as in Eqn. (2.8), with p(n) = K(1−n).
The adjoint squashing map τold,n for each n-photon subspace is known, and any
open parameters it may have after applying the linear constraints should be cho-
sen to maximize its smallest eigenvalue. This is so that p(n) is maximized and
therefore K is minimized, i.e. the number of copies of the original measurement
FM that are needed is minimized.
Here we choose to pick the squashing map τ+,n = 1n, which outputs a
maximally mixed qubit state 1Q/2. This fixes the post-processing to be such
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that the outcome i is assigned with probability Tr(1Q/2F
(i)
M ) whenever multiple
arms click at the same time. Now the smallest K should be found such that
(1− p(n)) is greater than or equal to the smallest eigenvalue of τold,n for all n.
Therefore τnew,n ≥ 0, and there exists a squashing map from the measurement
given by Eqn. (2.9) to the target measurement FQ via the adjoint squashing
map τnew from Eqn. (2.8).
2.4.2 BB84 Passive Basis Choice
An implementation of the method of choosing τ+ = 1 is the passive basis choice
for the BB84 or six-state measurements. This consists of each of the two (or
three) basis measurements at each end of a beamsplitter with the output ratios
1:1 (or 1:1:1, for the six-state protocol). Also, the probability p depends on
the photon number of the incoming signal n, and can be determined by the
probability that all of the n photons to go to one arm of the beamsplitter: p(n) =
2(1−n) for the BB84 detector, and p(n) = 3(1−n) for the six-state detector.
In this case, the squashing model exists for the BB84 passive detection
scheme, since we are adding a positive map to the already positive active squash-
ing map.
2.4.3 Six-State Passive Basis Choice
For the six-state protocol the linear constraints were satisfied, but the map
was not positive semidefinite. Therefore, we would like to find if the passive
squashing map τ is positive semidefinite. For the case of a single photon, n = 1,
there is an active squashing map, and therefore there is also a passive one. For
n ≥ 1 we use the formalism in this section, i.e. Eqn. (2.8), to determine if a
squashing map exists. To show that τnew is positive semidefinite, it is sufficient
to show that its smallest eigenvalue is non-negative. First, we use the reduction
arguments from Section 2.2.3 to reduce the squashing map into first a QND
measurement of the number of photons, as well as removing the vacuum as a
flag. We have τold,n from Section 2.3.2, p(n) = 3(1−n) from Section 2.4.2, and
τ+,n = 1n.
To estimate the smallest eigenvalue of τnew we estimate the smallest eigen-
value of τold. First, the full POVM elements for single clicks are rank 1 projec-
tors of the form 1/3|ψ〉〈ψ| (where |ψ〉 = |n, 0〉b,αor|0, n〉b,α), and therefore have
a largest eigenvalue of 1/3. Using this, and the fact that the largest and small-
est eigenvalue of the Pauli matrices are ±1, the lower bound on the smallest
eigenvalue of τold is:

















Now consider the smallest eigenvalue of the passive squashing map from Eqn. (2.8),
which gives 3(1−n) · (−1) + (1 − 3(1−n)) · 1. For n = 2 the lower bound on the
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smallest eigenvalue is 1/3, and since the lower bound increases with the pho-
ton number, the smallest eigenvalue is always positive. This proves that the
six-state passive detector has a squashing model.
2.5 Time-mode Squashing
The conditions used to find squashing models Eqns. (2.3) have been used so
far to find squashing maps that take multiple photon signals to single photon
ones. However, there are other high-dimensional degrees of freedom that are
not accounted for in experimental measurements. For example, measurements
typically accept signals over a time window, whose responses in a measurement
(such as detector clicks) are grouped together into what is called an “event”.
During the time window of an event, it is possible that a measurement receives
signals in multiple time modes. However, in theories it is often assumed that
signals are received only at a specific instant, or single time mode. Therefore,
in this section we discuss under what conditions a squashing model exists that
connects a full measurement with multiple time mode inputs to a target mea-
surement that only accepts a single time mode.
First, we would like to reduce the Hilbert spaceHM in order to find a squash-
ing map by solving Eqns. (2.3). Similarly to Section 2.2.3, we decompose a full
measurement that accepts multiple time modes into an equivalent measurement
whose squashing map acts on a smaller Hilbert space, and is therefore more
easily found. In addition, to simplify the analysis, we restrict the full and tar-
get measurements to the class of detectors that have outcomes originating from
threshold detectors.
For measurements on multiple time modes with threshold detectors, the full
measurement can be thought of as many copies of that same detector, each
measuring with the same setting (for example, the same basis) and each only
receiving one time mode. The output of each detector is then sent to a global
post-processing, which does the following: if a specific threshold detector is
triggered in any of the copies, then that threshold detector is recorded to have
clicked, and otherwise it is recorded not to have clicked (see Fig. 2.4). The
many copies of FM followed by the global post-processing is intuitive because
of the nature of threshold detectors. Typically there will be a time period after
a threshold detector is triggered where it is recovering, and it will not trigger
if more photons arrive. This recovery time is typically longer than the time
window allotted to a detection event. Therefore, as long as a threshold detector
fires once in the time window of an event, it does not matter if there are more
photons arriving, they will not give a different measurement outcome.
In addition, the global post-processing can be applied in the following way:
the first two detectors’ outcomes are post-processed using the same method
described above, and then the outcome of this along with the third detector’s
outcome is post-processed, and this post-processing is repeatedly cascaded for
all of the remaining detector copies. Now the original measurement is broken
up into many copies, followed by this cascaded post-processing. If there exists
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a squashing map that takes a full measurement on two time modes to a mea-
surement on a single time mode, then the first two detector copies with their
respective global post-processing can be reduced to the target measurement (a
measurement on one time mode). Now we have the exact same cascaded mea-
surement as before, except now there is a squashing model reducing the first
two time modes to a single time mode. Repeating this process for each of the
input time modes, the two time mode squashing map can be used to squash all














Figure 2.4: Two time modes can be split so that each time mode goes to a
measurement, such as the one performed in the BB84 protocol, both with the
same setting, followed by threshold detectors. The output is then fed to a global
post-processing that outputs a classical signal that corresponds to an outcome
of one copy of the measurement.
Now we focus on finding a squashing map from two time modes to a sin-
gle time mode. Since threshold detectors are being used, we can precede the
squashing map with a QND measurement of each of the two time modes. The
QND measurement outputs the photon numbers N and M for each time mode
respectively (see Fig. 2.5). Clearly if N or M is zero, then that mode can be
ignored, and we are only left with a single time mode, as desired. Otherwise
we require the specific form of the measurement, and therefore continue for the
specific case of the BB84 and six-state measurements discussed earlier. How-
ever, the steps outlined below are illustrative of how to find a similar squashing
map for other measurements.
First, we reduce the Hilbert space of the input to simplify the search for a
squashing map. To do this we perform a projection onto the four (or six, de-
pending on whether there are two or three bases for the measurement) dimen-
sional subspace Π spanned by the states {|n, 0〉α|m, 0〉α, |0, n〉α|0,m〉α}, and its
orthogonal complement, Π⊥. This is very similar to the steps taken in Sec-
tion 2.3.1. If the incoming signal is projected into Π⊥ then the outcome of the
measurement followed by the global post-processing is always a double click,
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regardless of the choice of basis. In this case the squashing map outputs a
state in a single time mode that will always give a double-click output, such
as |ψDC〉 = 1/
√
2(|5, 1〉 − |1, 5〉). If the input is projected into the (four or six
dimensional) subspace Π then we need to find an adjoint squashing map τ that
satisfies:
τR|F (i)One〉〉 = |F
(i)
Two〉〉, (2.11)
where F (i)One is the POVM element corresponding to a detector setup whose input
is in a single time mode in the subspace P (the space spanned by {|n, 0〉α, |0, n〉α},
where α ∈ {x, z}) mentioned previously for the BB84 measurement and F (i)Two
is the POVM element corresponding to a detector setup whose input is in two
time modes in the four dimensional polarization subspace Π. For the six-state
measurement, F (i)One is in a similar subspace Psix. Psix is a six dimensional

























Figure 2.5: The squashing map for two time modes each with two orthogonal
polarization modes. Each time mode is input to a QND measurement of the
number of photons. The result of this measurement is forwarded to a projection
map. Depending on the output of the projection, either a state that always
produces double clicks in the measurement is output |ψDC〉 = 1/
√
2(|5, 1〉 −
|1, 5〉), or a squashing map is applied in the subspace Π, which outputs a state
in a single time mode and two orthogonal polarization modes.
We can construct a squashing map, and hence a positive semidefinite oper-
ator τ that satisfies the linear constraints Eqn. (2.11), in the following way. We
define an operator U , which maps subspace P (Psix) to the subspace Π:
U |N +M, 0〉α = |N, 0〉α|M, 0〉α (2.12)
U |0, N +M〉α = |0, N〉α|0,M〉α, (2.13)
where two sequential kets represent the two time modes. This map is linear
since each of these states is linearly independent. This map preserves the inner
product of any two of the states above, which can be shown by the Gram matrix;
the matrix of inner products between each of the states. Here we show the four
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This implies that U is unitary.
Let us return to the POVM elements we want to satisfy Eqn. (2.11). First
consider the unnormalized POVM elements F (i)One:
|n, 0〉α〈n, 0|α, |0, n〉α〈0, n|α, (2.14)
where n corresponds to the number of photons in the single time mode Hilbert
space. The unnormalized POVM elements F (i)Two are
|N, 0〉α|M, 0〉α〈N, 0|α〈M, 0|,
|0, N〉α|0,M〉α〈0, N |α〈0,M |.
(2.15)
Clearly Λ(F (i)One) = UF
(i)
TwoU
† is a positive semidefinite map that satisfies the
linear constraints, and therefore there exists a squashing map between the mul-
timode and single mode detections. Therefore, by concatenating the multimode
squashing map with the single mode squashing maps found previously, there
exists a squashing model for the BB84 active and passive measurements, as well
as the six-state passive measurement for a multiple time mode, multi-photon
detector with respect to a single photon, single time mode one.
2.6 Imperfections
So far we have only considered examples of detectors that do not have any im-
perfections such as inefficiencies or dark counts. Inefficiencies occur when there
is a loss of photons within the detector, and dark counts occur when a thresh-
old detector clicks without any input photons. However, these are a realistic
factors in experimental measurements that should be considered in determining
the existence a squashing model. Here we examine these imperfections for the
examples considered previously: the BB84 and six-state measurements.
When there are inefficiencies, the loss at each threshold detector can be
modelled by a beamsplitter. If each of the threshold detectors used in the full
measurement all have a common inefficiency then these inefficiencies commute
with the polarizing beamsplitter(s), and, in the passive case, also commute with
the non-polarizing beamsplitter (see Fig. 2.6). Therefore, these measurements
with inefficiencies are equivalent to first a common inefficiency followed by a
perfectly efficient full measurement [Yur85]. If a squashing map exists for the
perfect full measurement, then the squashing map for the full measurement
with inefficiencies to the perfect target measurement is first a beamsplitter that
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models the loss, which is a completely positive map, followed by the squashing
map used previously for the perfect full measurement. The same concept can be
applied to misalignment errors, which can be described by a fixed depolarizing
channel on each photon individually. This is because the depolarizing channel












Figure 2.6: Inefficiencies can be modelled by a beamsplitter in front of each
threshold detector. Since the lossy beamsplitters commute with the polarizing
beamsplitter, it can be brought out in front of the measurement. Since the
full measurement FM has a squashing model, the squashing map for the lossy
detector is first a beamsplitter modelling the loss, followed by the squashing
map from Section 2.3.
If the inefficiencies of the threshold detectors are different, then a common
inefficiency can be removed as before, but the remaining full measurement has
a different structure, and its squashing model to a desired target detector has
to be found again. We leave this analysis for future work.
Dark counts can be accommodated as well if they obey a model that can
be described by a post-processing of the basic detection events [Lüt99a]. More
specifically, in a time window allotted to a detection event, each threshold de-
tector can fire with probability q without an incident photon. This means that
the full measurement is equivalent to a perfect physical detector followed by a
post-processing due to the dark counts and then the standard classical post-
processing of the double-click events (see Fig. 2.6). This dark count model
allows the classical post-processing used in the BB84 and six-state measure-
ments to be rearranged such that there is first the classical post-processing of
the double-click events, followed by a different post-processing caused by the
dark counts. In order for the two arrangements of the post-processings to be
equivalent, the new dark count post-processing can described by a bit flip of a
0 to a 1 or vice-versa with probability q/2, and kept with probability 1 − q/2,
and the vacuum is mapped to a 0 or a 1 with probability q + q2/2, and is kept
with probability 1 − 2q − q2. Since the combination of the perfect physical
detector and the standard classical post-processing has a squashing model, the
same squashing map applies, but now the target measurement is the same tar-
get measurement as before followed by the dark count post-processing. This
















Figure 2.7: Above: The dark counts can be modelled by a classical post-
processing, which is then followed by the standard classical post-processing of
randomly assigning double click events. Below: The standard post-processing
is done first, followed by a different dark count induced post-processing. The
squashing model can then be used on the full measurement FM . The two mea-
surement descriptions, followed by their respective post-processings, are equiv-
alent.
state (passive) measurement with dark counts, to a perfect target measurement
followed by the described dark count induced post-processing.
For QKD, a squashing model here means that single photons will be detected
in the target measurement, so a qubit security proof would now apply. However,
there will be additional noise added to the outputs of the target measurement
by the dark count post-processing. This adds an artificial increase in the error
rate. Bob cannot distinguish between errors introduced by Eve’s attack and the
dark count post-processing that adds errors. Therefore, more error correction
and privacy amplification will have to be applied, even though some of the error
rate is due to the dark count effect in Bob’s detector, and not due to Eve.
2.7 Numerical Results
In this section, we outline some numerical results that suggest that there exists
(or does not exist) a squashing model between specified full and target detector
setups. To find numerical evidence for a squashing model, we consider the typ-
ical scenario where the measurement can be preceded by a QND measurement
of the number of incoming photons (see Section 2.2.3). This allows us to find
a squashing map separately for each photon number subspace. For numerical
analysis, we use convex optimization techniques to find if there exists a squash-
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ing map by fixing the photon number, and finding the squashing map for each
photon number subspace separately. This is simple for low photon numbers, as
the dimension of the Hilbert space is small. However, as the photon number
becomes larger, the Hilbert space is also large, and it is more difficult to find the
squashing map. If in one of the photon subspaces, we find there does not exist a
squashing map for that subspace, then the complete squashing map connecting
a full and target measurement does not exist. If we find a squashing map for
a set of low photon number subspaces, this only suggests that there may exist
a squashing map, since we have not found a photon subspace in which there is
not a squashing map.
First we consider an example of a detector used in an implementation of
the BB84 protocol, using the relative phase of two pulses [Ben92], instead of
encoding signals in two orthogonal polarization modes. The detector used at
the receiver’s end accepts two pulses in different time modes and is described as
follows. There is a beamsplitter that has two outputs distributed in a 1:1 ratio.
The output arms have a length difference equal to the difference in spacing of
the input time slots. Also on the long arm, there is a phase modulator that
either does nothing, or applies a π phase shift. The long and short arms are
then each connected to the inputs of another beamsplitter with a ratio of 1:1,
whose outputs each have a threshold detector (see Fig. 2.8). Since there are two
input time slots, and a delay in one of the arms, there are three possible time
slots at which clicks of the threshold detectors can occur.
Typically, for QKD, a 0 is recorded when one of the threshold detector clicks
in the middle output time slot, and a 1 is recorded when the other threshold
detector clicks in the middle time slot. These events occur when the first input
pulse goes along the long arm of the detector, and the second input pulse goes
along the short arm. Then the two arms interfere at the second beamsplitter to
determine the relative phase between the input pulses. In addition, an eaves-
dropper could input signals before and after the two time slots we are interested
in, modifying the detection events. To avoid this, a shutter can be placed in
front of the detector so that only the two time slots are allowed to enter the
detector, and any additional inputs are blocked.
For quantum communication purposes it would be convenient to have a
squashing model that connects this detector, which accepts any number of pho-
tons or the vacuum in two time slots as input, to the same detector, which only
accepts a single photon in two time slots or the vacuum as input. There is also
a classical post-processing of the basic detection events. Here we choose that a
0 or 1 event is kept as it is, and a double click between the two middle output
time slots is randomly assigned to either a 0 or 1 event. All other events are
mapped to the vacuum. Using semidefinite programming we can solve the linear
constraints and positivity condition Eqns. (2.3) for a specified photon number,
and in this case we find that at least up to n = 10 there is a squashing map for
the given full measurement to the given target measurement.
Realistic threshold detectors, such as avalanche photodiodes, have a recovery
time (or downtime) where they do not respond to input after a click event.











Figure 2.8: The measurement performed in the BB84 protocol with phase en-
coding. The input is in two time modes separated by a distance equal to the
length difference in the two arms of the detector. On the long arm, a phase
shift Φ is performed which either does nothing, or applies a π phase shift.
time slots are measured, the threshold detectors do not click in later time slots
if they click in an earlier time slot. This means that if there is a click in the
first time slot for one of the threshold detectors, then there will not be a click
in the second or third time slot for that detector. The same post-processing
is used here as before of randomly assigning double clicks in the middle time
slot. Note that we do not know in this scenario if the third time slot fires after
there are clicks in the middle time slot of each threshold detector. Searching for
a numerical solution using the defined post-processing, we find that the linear
constraints Eqn. (2.3a) cannot be satisfied for n = 3, and therefore a squashing
model does not exist. However, different post-processings could be attempted,
as well as variations in the target measurement to attempt to recover a squashing
model.
Alternatively, shutters can be placed directly before each of the threshold
detectors so that only the middle time slot signals are allowed to pass into
the detectors. Unfortunately we do not recover the squashing model in this
case for the full measurement to the target measurement with post-processing
described above; starting at the n = 2 subspace the squashing map is not
positive. Therefore, a squashing map does not exist. However, as seen in the
previous example, changes to the post-processing and target measurement could
help result in a squashing map.
2.8 Other Quantum Communication Applications
The examples of squashing maps considered so far are all directly connected
to QKD protocols. However, the squashing model has applications in other
quantum communication tasks as well. In this section we discuss an example
of a measurement performed in a coin flipping protocol. In this protocol two
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separated parties, Alice and Bob, try to create a list of common random bits.
However, one of the parties is allowed to cheat. Classically a single party who
cheats can control the outcome of the bit they share. However, using quantum
signals for communication places a bound on the bias that can be introduced
by a cheating party [BBB+09]. Since a party may be cheating, it is important
to remove any assumptions on their behaviour. As an example, single photons
should be used in the protocol, but due to cheating, Alice may send multi-
photon signals. In order to remove the assumption that single photons must be
sent, it would be useful to find a squashing model connecting the measurement
performed by Bob to its single photon equivalent. If such a squashing map
exists, then the scenario where multi-photon signals are measured is equivalent
to the case where first a squashing map is performed followed by an equivalent
measurement that only accepts single photons. Then the squashing map can be
given to the quantum communication channel. Since the channel will reduce the
signals into a single photon, a cheating Alice that sends multi-photon signals will
have them reduced to a single photon. Therefore, the existence of a squashing
model in this case ensures that a cheating Alice has no advantage in sending
multi-photon signals.
Now we consider finding a squashing map for the measurement used in an
implementation of the coin flipping protocol [BSGT]. In this implementation
the phase-encoded BB84 measurement is used, as it was described in Section 2.7
with the following differences. There is no phase modulation performed in the
long arm of the detector. Also, the outcomes of the two threshold detectors,
which can click in one of three time slots, are interpreted differently: a 0 in the
z basis occurs when only a particular threshold detector clicks in the middle
time slot, and a 1 in the z basis occurs when a other threshold detector clicks
in the middle time slot. A 0 in the x basis occurs when when one or both
detectors click in the first time slot, and a 1 in the x basis occurs when one or
both detectors click in the third time slot. Since double clicks can occur which
make the outcome ambiguous, we apply a post-processing to these events, which
is described as follows. When both detectors fire in the middle time slot, the
outcome is randomly assigned to 0 or 1 in the z basis. When there is at least
one click in the first and third time slots, the outcome is randomly assigned to
0 or 1 in the x basis. Any other event is post-processed to be 0 or 1 in either
the x or z basis at random.
Now that the detector and corresponding post-processing is defined, we may
look for a squashing map that connects this full measurement to its single photon
equivalent. Note that the vacuum component can be removed as a flag, since
the vacuum projection is only contained in a single POVM element and none of
the others (see Section 2.2.3). In addition, the POVM elements that describe
this measurement are the same as those for the BB84 polarization measurement
with a passive basis choice, except the labelling for the POVM elements have
the bit and basis are flipped. For example, F0,x for the BB84 measurement is
equal to F1,z for the measurement used here. This equivalence is not surprising,
since both measurements begin with a 1:1 beamsplitter that performs the action
of choosing a basis, followed by a measurement that determines the bit value.
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Therefore, the desired squashing map exists, since we may reuse the squashing
map found previously for the BB84 polarization measurement. This ensures
that cheating parties in the coin flipping protocol do not have an advantage by
sending multi-photon signals.
2.9 Future Work
A formalism has been developed to find whether a squashing model exists that
connects a given full and target measurement. It has been applied to several
examples of detectors commonly used in quantum communication. There are
also many other measurements used in quantum communication whose squash-
ing models would be useful to find. However, we leave the exploration of further
examples to future work.
Also, in each of the examples considered in this Chapter, it is always assumed
that perfect POVM elements that describe the full measurement setup are an
accurate description of the experimental measurement. However, in a practical
measurement setup it would be desirable to be able to ensure the squashing
model holds even if the full POVM elements are slightly different. This could
be due to misalignment of the detectors, or other abnormalities, which would
differentiate the measurement from their perfect POVM description. Since the
squashing map depends directly on the POVM elements (see Eqn. 2.3), the
formalism should then take this deviation into account. More formally, the
squashing map should satisfy the linear constraints, as well as the positivity
condition for a small parameter region around the desired full POVM elements.
This would allow for a more robust squashing map, that could accept some
small modifications in the full measurement description. However, this requires
a modification of the formalism described in this thesis in order to properly
accommodate this ”approximate” squashing model.
In addition, it would be advantageous to prove that a general class of mea-
surements has a squashing model to avoid having to find a squashing map
for each full and target detection separately. For example, we have seen that
the BB84 and six-state passive detection measurements have squashing models.
Then perhaps all linear optical networks followed by threshold detectors on the
output modes have a squashing map connecting its measurement of many in-
put photons to the equivalent measurement on a single photon. This class of
detectors contains many measurements performed in quantum communication,







Because of the key role of entanglement in applications much effort is put into
realizing this fragile resource in the lab, for example via parametric down-
conversion (PDC) sources or with ion traps, to only name a few. In a real
experiment it is of course desirable to unambiguously verify the creation of en-
tanglement, and in fact many different operational tools have been developed
over the past years to achieve this task, cf. Ref. [GT09] for a review. A reliable
entanglement verification has to satisfy a few crucial criteria [vELK07]; most
importantly the verification method should not rely on assumptions from the
entanglement generation process, but instead on the information acquired about
the system via measurements. Moreover the obtained data should be considered
under a worst case scenario, i.e., the test is only considered to be affirmative if
the data exclude compatibility with all separable states (in the limiting case of
an infinite number of experimental runs), in similar spirit as already motivated
in Ref. [HHH99]. This viewpoint is even essential for certain tasks like quantum
cryptography [CLL04].
Still it is typical to allow one basic ingredient: since usually quantum me-
chanics is considered to be true, it is common to assume that an accurate quan-
tum mechanical description of the employed measurement devices exists; to
actually test or to “measure” a measurement device is anyway often combined
with other assumptions [LAFCR+09] or seems to be unlikely to work in practice
if really no assumptions are made [MY04, DMMS07].
An example of a straightforward and hence quite often applied entanglement
verification method, e.g., Ref. [JKMW01], is the following procedure which we
call the tomography entanglement test in the following: since the useful en-
tanglement might be confined to a low dimensional subspace, e.g., the single
photon-pair subspace of a PDC source or two very long-lived energy levels of
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two ions in a trap, only a few different measurements are needed to obtain
tomography on this subspace. After several runs of the experiment there is
enough data collected to reconstruct the underlying density operator on this
subspace via some reconstruction technique. Note that here the knowledge of
the measurement description is employed. In order to check for entanglement
the reconstructed density operator can be checked to see if it describes an en-
tangled state or not.
However, is entanglement really verified via this method? The problem
lies within the measurement description, because such ideal measurements, as
the ones used in the reconstruction mechanism, might not have actually been
performed in the experiment. Good examples are the BB84 or six-state polar-
ization measurements, which are often employed in photonic experiments. As
we have seen in the previous Chapter, these measurements do not respond solely
to the single photon subspace, since such detectors can receive any number of
photons. Hence the question arises whether entanglement is still verified if a
more realistic measurement description is employed. The main purpose of this
chapter is to study this question. Note that the aforementioned scenario often
occurs, not because we are not aware of the more realistic model, but because
an oversimplified measurement description is employed in order to ease the task
of entanglement verification.
Specific instances of the problems considered here have been investigated
in several works in the literature. In Ref. [SU07] inequalities for the detection
of entanglement for two qubits have been proposed, where the measurement’s
devices can be misaligned to a certain degree. Bell-type inequalities which are
independent of the spectrum of the measured observables have been recently in-
troduced in Ref. [SV09]. Moreover, for an experiment with photons from atomic
ensembles, an entanglement verification scheme which takes multi-photon events
into account has been introduced [LvC+09] and implemented [PCD+09].
In this Chapter we proceed along the following lines: In Section 3.1.1 we
provide an example of a tomography entanglement test which indeed leads to
the wrong conclusion about the presence of entanglement under a small, physical
change of the employed measurement description.
In Section 3.2, we modify the formalism introduced in Section 2.2 to arrive
at new conditions such that entanglement verification mistakes by assuming a
simplified measurement description can be safely be excluded. In short, the
entanglement verification process remains valid as soon as the considered set of
operators are connected by a positive map (as apposed to the previous chapter,
where we had a completely positive map).
In Section 3.3 we reformulate the existence of such a positive map into a
necessary and sufficient condition which provides a particular intuitive solution
for the tomography entanglement test: the map exists if and only if each classical
outcome pattern from the refined set of full observables remains compatible with
the oversimplified set of target observables.
Then, in Section 3.4 we prove that the six-state polarization measurement
can be linked to its single photon realization by a positive map, even though a
completely positive map does not exist (see Section 2.3.2). This analysis con-
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cludes that the tomography entanglement test which is typically employed for a
PDC source [KBAW00] or even in multipartite photonic experiments [WSK+08]
using the single photon assumption can indeed be made valid if the double click
events are taken into account.
3.1.1 Example: Ion Trap Entanglement Verification
Let us first mention a simple, yet practically relevant example, which shows that
the tomography entanglement test indeed can lead to a false conclusion about
the presence of entanglement if the structure of the observables is not properly
taken into account.
For a single 40Ca-ion in a trap it is typically to consider only the lowest two
energy levels given by a lower level |S〉 = |1〉 and the upper level |D〉 = |0〉 and
treats them as a qubit [HRB08]. Resonance fluorescence provides a mechanism
to read out the occupation number of the energy levels: An electron in the |S〉
state is coupled to a higher energy level |P 〉, and observing photons from the
|S〉 ↔ |P 〉 transition signals that the qubit was in the state |S〉. This overall
process corresponds to a projection onto the lower energy state and consequently
allows to measure the σz Pauli operator, while the measurement along different
directions is achieved by a local basis rotation prior to the σz measurement, cf.
Ref. [HRB08].
In order to avoid too many measurements it is common to measure the
occupation probability only for the state |S〉, simply because for qubits the
other probability is p(D) = 1 − p(S) due to the normalization, and similarly
for the other basis settings. Suppose that this measurement procedure is used
to obtain tomography in order to verify the creation of entanglement between
two separated ions in a trap. Now consider the example that the observed
expectation values, abstractly denoted as Eij(p) and characterized by a noise
parameter p, may allow the reconstruction of the state
ρ(p) = (1− p)|ψ+〉〈ψ+|+ p1
4
. (3.1)
To test to see if this state is entangled, we use the positive partial transpose
(PPT) criterion. This criterion says that if the partial transpose of a bipartite
(qubit-qubit) entangled state is not positive semidefinite, then the state was
entangled. Using this criteria, the state in Eqn. 3.1, is entangled for p < 2/3.
However in practice the situation is more complicated since the ion is not a
simple two-level system. To model this, another energy level can be added to
only one of the ions, thereby enlarging the two-qubit system to a qubit-qutrit
one (see Fig. 3.1.1). Without any additional information about the occupation
number of this extra level, it is clear that the assignment p(D) = 1 − p(S) is
not correct any more. Consequently the observed data Eij(p) can only verify
entanglement for the case p < 0.63. This can be checked by using the tools
from Ref. [CM07], in which the search for an appropriate separable state was
phrased into a semidefinite program. Hence we have the interval p ∈ [0.63, 2/3),









Case 1:  Alice and Bob have: Case 2: Bob has:
Figure 3.1: An ion in a trap can be modelled by a two level system, and the
occupation of the lower level of the ion |S〉 is measured. Due to normalization,
the other energy level |P 〉 may be inferred from the measurement on |S〉. How-
ever, if this model is incorrect, and there is another energy level not taken into
account on Bob’s side (|D〉), then the occupation of |P 〉 may different from that
inferred from the single measurement on |S〉.
of entanglement although with the more realistic model it does not. Though
this region might be small this error can become important in the multipar-
tite scenario, where current experiments just operate at the border of genuine
multipartite entanglement [HHR+05, LKS+05, GLY+08]. Concerning the ex-
perimental consequences, however, two facts are important:
1. For experiments with ion traps it is known that the occupation probability
for levels apart from the two logical states is very small. Given this addi-
tional measurement data, it is possible to provide a quantitative estimate
of the resulting error in the used entanglement verification scheme, e.g.,
the mean value of an entanglement witness. For typical entanglement wit-
nesses employed in those scenarios, this error is far below the unavoidable
statistical uncertainty, which is caused by the finite number of copies of a
state available in any experiment.
2. Note that the probabilities p(S) and p(D) of each energy level can be
measured independently by additional local rotations, hence at the ex-
pense of more measurements. Then the resulting probabilities correspond
to the unnormalized two-level state ρred that is obtained from our mod-
eled three-level system ρtot by a local projection, i.e., ρred = ΠρtotΠ, with
Π = |S〉〈S| + |D〉〈D|. As long as we prove entanglement of the two-qubit
system ρABred = 1⊗ΠρABtot1⊗Π, this also implies entanglement for the total
state ρABtot , since the projection is local.
For instance, if an entanglement witness is measured, such as: W =
|00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11| − |x+x+〉〈x+x+| − |x−x−〉〈x−x−|+ |y+y+〉〈y+y+|
+ |y−y−〉〈y−y−|, with |x±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/
√
2 and |y±〉 = (|0〉 ± i|1〉)/
√
2
[GT09], then the mean value of this witness is just a linear combination of
certain probabilities on the qubit space, and if the mean value is negative,
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the state ρABred and hence ρ
AB
tot is entangled. This shows that additional di-
mensions of the Hilbert space alone do not invalidate the conclusion that
the state is entangled when the measurement devices are characterized
properly.
3.2 Positive Squashing Maps
Now we return to the formalism introduced in Section 2.2.1. For each local
measurement, we have a target measurement, with POVM elements F (i)Q , which
has a simple form that we would like to use for the entanglement verification
process. Also there is a full measurement, with POVM elements F (i)M , which
describes a realistic model of the actual detector in the experiment. In the above
ion-trap example we considered the case of qubit target observables, while our
full operators were acting on a qutrit system.
Consider the case where in an experiment the expectation values of the full
operators F (i)M are measured, but instead they are interpreted as the expectation
values of the target observables F (i)Q . The question arises, whether this may
lead to a false entanglement verification. In the following we provide a simple
condition on the two operator sets only which excludes such a possibility, and
hence guarantees the presence of entanglement.
As in the previous chapter, we would like a squashing model that equates the
full measurement to a squashing map followed by the target measurement (cf.
Fig. 2.2). The difference here is that we do not require the squashing map to
be completely positive or trace-preserving. However, the squashing map must
be positive, so that its output is a valid density operator that will be measured















where ρF is the input density operator in the full Hilbert space. Because of
the similarities of this squashing map to the one in the previous chapter, we
use the term positive squashing operation in order to refer to the map Λ (or
its adjoint Λ†) in this chapter. Note that we could still consider the case of
a trace-preserving map Λ (or unital map Λ†) such that density operators are
mapped to properly normalized density operators; however this requirement is
not mandatory. An example of a non-trace preserving, but positive map between
operator sets is given by the matrix of moments, also called the expectation
value matrix, [SV05, HML08, MPHH]. The only difference is that we must be
careful with entanglement criteria on the target space that explicitly employ the
normalization of the density operators, but this can also be dealt with [MPHH].
The advantage of such a positive squashing operation here is that the struc-
ture of separable states (from the full to the target Hilbert space) remains in-
variant, and hence any successful entanglement verification on the target space
directly translates to a positive verification statement on the full Hilbert space.
More formally, suppose if a positive (but not necessarily completely positive)
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trace-preserving squashing map exists for a set of full and target measurements,
then it obeys the first line of Eqn. (2.2). If entanglement verification is per-
formed such that two parties, Alice and Bob, use the full measurement, but





Q,B , then they also prove the presence of entanglement for the full
operator set F (i)M,A ⊗ F
(j)
M,B . An analogous statement holds for more than two
particles.
To prove this statement, consider the data that provide the expectation val-









Q,B ] due to the property of the squashing operation. Now for any separable










pk ΛA(ρkA)⊗ ΛB(ρkB), (3.3)
which represents a valid (normalized) separable density operator on the bipartite
target Hilbert space because of positivity of the corresponding (unital) maps,
and is compatible with the observed data. Consequently, if the incompatibility
of the mean values of F (i)Q with all separable states on the target space can be
proven, then the density matrix on the full space must be entangled. Note that
here we only need positivity of ΛA and ΛB and not complete positivity.
Note that a local squashing operation between operator sets does not repre-
sent the most general map between bipartite observable sets that preserve the
structure of separable states; however we neglect other options on behalf of the
“locality” of this connection. Furthermore note that since we do not require a
completely positive map, it can happen that unphysical (not positive semidef-
inite) density matrix can be obtained on the target space; such an operator
is then also incompatible with a separable state. However this situation can
only occur for an entangled state on the full bipartite Hilbert space, hence the
conclusion of the entanglement verification process remains unaffected.
Finally, let us add that the precise state reconstruction technique needed
for the tomography entanglement test, either direct inversion of Born’s rule or
maximum likelihood estimation [Hra97] (although there are even problems as-
sociated with them [BK]), does not conflict with a positive but not completely
positive squashing operation. If the corresponding operator on the target space
is positive semidefinite both reconstruction techniques deliver the same opera-
tor (in the limit where exact knowledge of the expectation value is obtained).
Because any separable state is represented by a valid separable target state
this excludes the possibility that a separable state is mapped to an entangled
state by the reconstruction process. In the case of an unphysical “entangled”
target operator a direct inversion of Born’s rule the entanglement would be
directly “witnessed”. Note that in this case it should be convincing that the
actual measurement description FAQ ⊗ FBQ cannot be the precise one for the
experiment. In contrast the maximum likelihood method produces the closest
positive semidefinite operator [BK] (with respect to the likelihood “distance”),
39
hence an unphysical, entangled target state can be mapped to a separable state
via this reconstruction technique and thus escapes the tomography entangle-
ment test. But this does not bother us here, because some entangled states are
missed anyway due to the simplified operator set.
3.3 Criteria for the Existence of a
Positive Squashing Map
In this section we investigate which requirements need to be fulfilled by the
two different operator sets in order to be connected by a positive squashing
operation. In the previous chapter, we used the Choi-Jami lkowski isomorphism
to get a handle on the squashing map. We could continue along this vein,
and in that case, the Choi-Jami lkowski operator τA ⊗ τB would correspond to
an entanglement witness. The linear constraints Eqn. 2.3a could be solved,
and then any remaining open parameters would have to be chosen such that
the Choi-Jami lkowski operator is an entanglement witness. However, for our
purposes here, we take a different path that provides a clear interpretation for
the existence of such a positive linear map and which will also be employed in
the next section to try to find the positive squashing model for the six-state
polarization measurement.
The linear constraint Eqn. (3.3) directly allows us to read off a neces-
sary condition: it states that for each physical density operator ρF in the full
Hilbert space there exists a valid density operator Λ(ρF) (as long as Λ is trace-
preserving) in the target space such that both operators assign the same ex-
pectation values for the considered observables. Hence all possible expectation
values Ei that can in principle be observed on the full Hilbert space must remain
physical with respect to the target observables. As we will see, this condition
also becomes sufficient if the target POVM elements F (i)Q with i = 1, . . . , n pro-
vide a complete tomographic set. We can then make the following statement:
The tomography entanglement test is error-free as long as the full local observ-
ables on Alice and Bob’s side can only produce measurement results which are
also consistent with the local target, or reconstruction observables.
For the following proposition we need to define the set of possible physical





∣∣there is a ρ ∈ D(HF ) such that
Ei = Tr(ρF
(i)
M ) for all i = 1, . . . n
}
, (3.4)
and a similar definition for the operator set on the target system SQ. To con-
clude, we have the following characterization:
Proposition 3.3.1 (Existence). The set of full observables {F (i)M } and the to-
mographically complete set of target observables {F (i)Q } are related by a unital
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squashing operation Λ† if and only if it holds that SM ⊆ SQ. If the set of consid-
ered observables on the target space is not tomographically complete, then both
observable sets can be extended by appropriate target and full operators in order
to meet this condition.
Proof. One direction of the proof is clear: suppose that there exists a positive
trace-preserving squashing operation Λ. For any ~E ∈ SM we must have a
density operator ρF such that Ei = Tr(ρFF
(i)
M ) = Tr[Λ(ρF)F
(i)
Q ]. Because of the
properties of the corresponding map we receive a valid target density operator
ρT := Λ(ρF) which provides the same expectation values ~E, hence ~E ∈ SQ.
This shows that SM ⊆ SQ, and hence proves the first direction.
For the other direction, we employ the fact that the set of target opera-
tors are tomographically complete and the set inclusion SM ⊆ SQ to explicitly
write down the positive squashing operation. First note that for a given set of
physical expectation values ~E ∈ ST, the corresponding target density operator
is uniquely determined by a direct inversion of Born’s rule, RT : ~E 7→ ρT( ~E),
i.e., by a linear reconstruction mechanism that maps the expectation values to
its explicit density operator. Moreover for a given full density operator ρF the
corresponding expectation values are already determined, which is described by
the linear map MF : ρF 7→ ~E. Combining these two maps according to
Λ = RT ◦MF (3.5)
provides the squashing operation. That is, for a given input state ρF, the
expectation values Ei of the full operator set are first computed and then these
values are used in the reconstruction algorithm (that depends on the target
operators) to obtain the corresponding target output state. The set inclusion
guarantees that any valid full density operator is mapped to a valid target
state, hence the described map is already positive. Since both maps in the
decomposition are linear the overall map is linear as well. This proves that we
have a unital squashing map Λ†, and hence have proved the other direction.
The non-tomographic case directly follows from the tomographic one, since
the positive linear map Λ† requires that it is defined on the complete target
operator space, or equivalently on a set of operators that provides tomography.
Therefore, the addition of operators to ensure that tomography is performed
allows a squashing map to exist.
In a concrete example the proposition only helps if the sets S are known.
Although in general this can be a non-trivial task, approximation techniques can
be employed for a special set of observables or even a hyperplane characterization
for the exact determination, see Ref. [MKL08] for more details.
Finally, let us note that a completely positive map can be characterized by
a set inclusion requirement as well, if an additional reference system R is added
with dimension equal to that of the full space (or of the target space, in the case
the dual map) on each side, because complete positivity of Λ just means that
idR ⊗ Λ is positive. However, we could also use the formalism developed in the
previous Chapter, which might be a more useful approach.
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3.4 Example: Six-State Active Basis Choice
In this section, we apply the developed formalism to a relevant physical mea-
surement setup: the six-state polarization measurement with an active basis
choice, as described in Section 2.3.2. This measurement is not only useful for
QKD, but can also be used in entanglement verification as it performs tomog-
raphy on an input qubit space. We would like to find a squashing map for the
full measurement on a multi-photon input in the space of two orthogonal po-
larization modes to the same measurement, but on a single photon and vacuum
input in two orthogonal polarization modes. First, we know from the previous
chapter that there does not exist a completely positive squashing map (cf. Sec-
tion 2.3.2). As such, a positive squashing map may exist instead, so we apply
the formalism developed in this section, and in particular Prop. 3.3.1.
In order to find a squashing map, the double click events must be post-
processed, since these events are incompatible with a single photon interpreta-
tion, but they nevertheless contribute to the normalization. This is typically
done by the process of randomly assigning double click events in each basis to a
random bit value in the same basis, which was introduced in the previous chap-
ter. We start with a perfect polarization mode description of the full operators;
imperfections like finite efficiency or dark counts are considered later (see also
Ref. [Lüt99a]). The “no click” outcome is independent of the chosen polarization
basis and becomes Fvac,α = |0, 0〉〈0, 0|. All other observables are block-diagonal




i,α and for a
fixed number of photons the POVM elements have the same form as in Eqn. 2.4,
since this is essentially the same measurement performed in the BB84 case, ex-





1n+(−1)i (|n, 0〉α〈n, 0| − |0, n〉α〈0, n|)
]
, (3.6)
with i ∈ {0, 1}, α is one of the bases {x, y, z}, and 1n represents the identity
operator in the n-photon subspace, which appears because of the chosen post-
processing scheme. This perfect polarization description is also employed for
the target operators, however only acting on the vacuum FQvac,α = |0, 0〉〈0, 0| or
on the single photon subspace FQi,α = F
1
i,α with i = 0, 1.
Let us further comment on these observable sets: Note that if the following
standard basis for the single photon subspace |1, 0〉z = |0〉 and |0, 1〉z = |1〉 is
selected, then each difference of the single click outcomes equals to a familiar
Pauli operator, i.e., σα = F 10,α − F 11,α for all α. Hence each of the single click
operators FQi,α with i = 0, 1 corresponds to a projection onto one of the two
different eigenstates of the related Pauli operator σα. Furthermore the cor-
responding difference between the full observables Fα = F0,α − F1,α is again
block-diagonal and each n-photon part is given by
Fnα = F
n
0,α − Fn1,α = |n, 0〉α〈n, 0| − |0, n〉α〈0, n|, (3.7)
according to Eqn. (3.6). Note that these observables are also accessible with a
different polarization measurement that only uses a single threshold detector,
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and which has alternatively been employed for polarization experiments, cf.
Ref. [JKMW01]. In this setup, only one of the outputs of the polarizing beam
splitter. It is direct that the operators Fα can be obtained by using the difference
of the two outputs. However in order to obtain the normalization, the overall
input has to be measured via a threshold detector, i.e.with no polarizing beam
splitter. Therefore, the measurement should include both threshold detectors,
one at each end of the polarizing beamsplitter.
The following theorem proves the positive squashing property between the
two given sets of observables; however it also applies to the other measurement
description of Ref. [JKMW01].
Theorem 3.4.1. There exists a positive, but not completely positive unital
squashing operation Λ† for the operator sets {FQi,α} and {Fi,α}, i.e. Λ
†(FQi,α) =
Fi,α. Therefore, the interpretation of the {Fi,α} as single photon measurements
{FQi,α} does not invalidate the entanglement verification scheme.
Proof. In order to prove the existence of a positive squashing operation we
only need to focus on the “click” events, since the vacuum part can be directly
removed by a projection discriminating between the vacuum and all other Fock
states, i.e.it can be removed as a flag. Note that it is sufficient to prove the
squashing operation for a complete set of linear independent target operators
only, because other linear dependencies are implicitly present in the linear map.
In short, it is equivalent to prove a unital squashing operation Λ†(σα) = Fα for
all α ∈ {x, y, z}, where Fα is the described difference between the click outcomes
of the full observables.
Since we only concentrate on the single photon subspace we are equipped
with a full tomographic set and hence can readily apply Prop. 3.3.1, such that
it remains to prove SM ⊂ SQ. Since each full observable is photon number
diagonal, SM is given by the convex hull of all n-photon sets SnM , i.e., the set
of physical expectation values on an n-photon state. Hence we need to verify
that each n-photon state can only produce expectation values which are also
compatible with a single photon state, i.e., SnM ⊂ S1M = SQ for all n ≥ 1. The
set S1M directly equals the familiar Bloch sphere. Hence we prove the existence
of a positive squashing operation if we can show that∑
α∈{x,y,z}
[Tr(ρFnα )]
2 ≤ 1 (3.8)
holds for all n-photon density operators ρ, and for all photon numbers n ≥ 1.
In order to simplify the analysis in the following, each operator Fnα can be
regarded as an operator acting onto an n-qubit space. Indeed, the n-photon
Hilbert space HnM = Cn+1 is isomorphic to the symmetric subspace Sym(Hn)
of an n-qubit system Hn = (C2)⊗n. Using the given standard basis definition
we obtain:
Fnz = |0〉〈0|
⊗n − |1〉〈1|⊗n, (3.9)
while for any other operator Fnα the states |0〉, |1〉 are replaced with the eigen-
vectors of the corresponding Pauli matrix σα.
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π denotes the sum over all possible permutations π(·) of the subsystems
that yield different terms.
Next, we exploit the result from Ref. [TG05] that for odd j every quantum


















This inequality is based on the property that the observables π(σ⊗jα ⊗ 1⊗(n−j))
with α ∈ {x, y, z} have all eigenvalues equal to ±1 and anti-commute pairwise.
To prove this property, let Mi be anti-commuting observables (i.e., MiMj +
MjMi = 0 for all i 6= j) with M2i = 1 for all i and let λi be real coefficients with∑
i λ
2
i = 1. Then (
∑
i λiMi)
2 = 1. Therefore, (
∑






i λi〈Mi〉 ≤ 1, and, since the λi are arbitrary,
∑
i〈Mi〉2 ≤ 1.
Note that this identity holds for all occurring j and for all possible permu-

























where the inequality Eqn. 3.11 and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality was used to
upper bound each term in the squared bracket by 1. For the final result the
numbers of distinct permutations π need to be counted, which is given by a
corresponding binomial coefficient.
How can we now use this result in the tomography entanglement test of a
PDC source? First each party measures along all three different polarization
axes. Next an active post-processing of the double click events needs to be done
or the corresponding rates and/or probabilities of the full operators need to be
computed. Afterwards both parties can safely use the single photon assumption,
or more precisely, the set of perfect single photon target operators {FQi,α} to
compute the corresponding two-qubit state ρAB (single photon subspace on each
side) via their preferred reconstruction technique. In case that this reconstructed
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state is entangled, the observed data still verify entanglement if both parties
believe in the more realistic measurement description {FMi,α}.
Next we consider imperfections of the photo-detectors. We can apply the
same tools used in Section 2.6 to the detector here. This means that if there is
a common inefficiency for the threshold detectors, then the squashing map for
the imperfect measurement is first a beamsplitter modelling the loss, followed
by the perfect squashing map. The same is true for misalignment errors, which
can be modeled by a fixed depolarizing channel on each photon individually.
For dark counts that can be modeled as a particular post-processing scheme
on the classical outcomes, the same procedure in Section 2.6 applies. Even the
extension to a multi time-mode description is possible using the map found in
Section 2.5. Therefore we can use the squashing map to first turn multiple time
modes into a single one, followed by a squashing map that takes multi-photon
signals, to a single photon.
Concerning real experiments, note that double-clicks in a spatial mode can
occur due to different physical mechanisms. First, it can happen that due to the
higher orders in the PDC process more than the desired number of photons are
generated and injected into the setup. Second, dark counts may lead to double
click events. Finally, double click events can arise from the statistical nature
of the state preparation: In many experiments (cf. Ref. [LZG+07]) entangled
multi-photon states are generated by producing several entangled photon pairs
first, and then letting them interact via beam splitters. However, the desired
state is typically only produced if all the photons are distributed uniformly over
all the spatial modes, but which normally does not happen all the time. Hence
it can occur (due to the state preparation process) that one of the spatial modes
contains more than just one photon, which then drastically increases the double
click rate at the outcome side.
While the double click rates by the described first two mechanisms are typi-
cally very small, the contribution of the last mechanism can be quite large. For
instance using the state preparation setup from Ref. [LZG+07] the probability
that one of the spatial modes contains two photons is as high as 75%.
Then, it is worth mentioning that the post-processing used in the above
scheme is usually not applied in real experiments: double click events are typi-
cally just thrown away. It should be stressed that for double click events from
the third mechanism this is justified: Since in this case some spatial mode does
not contain any photon, disregarding these events is equivalent to projecting the
total multi-photon state onto the space where each mode contains at least one
photon. Since this is a local projection it cannot produce fake entanglement.
For the other mechanisms, this depends (similar to the ion trap example before)
on the actual double count rates and hence on the concrete experiment.
Usually the amount of these undesired events is usually small. For instance,
see the 4-photon experiment of Ref. [WSK+08]. It should be noted, however,
that in experiments with more and more photons, these rates can be higher
[LWZ+09], so that the penalty effect of the post-processing scheme becomes
larger.
Additionally, it can be proved that the corresponding squashing map is com-
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pletely positive on the single and two photon subspace (cf. Section 2.3.2). Hence
a violation of positivity of the corresponding target density operator is only ob-
served if the local multi-photon contributions are very large in comparison to
the single and double photon part (and even then only for very particular en-
tangled states); consequently it is very unlikely to observe such a non-positive
target operator in a real PDC experiment.
As a last point we should make it clear that the Theorem 3.4.1 cannot
always be applied. Especially in multipartite experiments, it can happen that
we do not want to obtain full tomography on the multipartite target space
but instead tries to measure an entanglement witness with the least number
of different global measurement settings. This may require more than three
different settings on each photon. For instance, in the six-photon experiment
of Ref. [LZG+07] an entanglement witness was measured which required seven
measurements settings of the type Mi ⊗Mi ⊗ ... ⊗Mi, which is a significant
advantage compared with the 36 = 729 settings required for state tomography.
However, on each photon, seven polarization measurements have been made
and the target observables are tomographically overcomplete. In such cases this
theorem does not apply, because the linear dependencies imposed by the target
operators are not satisfied by the full observable set, cf. Eqn. (3.2), hence the
local squashing operation does not exist. Here one might proceed with a global,
separable squashing operation as was discussed in Section 3.2.
3.5 Further Directions
The formalism used to connect a full measurement to a target measurement
(cf. Eqn. 3.3) uses a specific form of the squashing map. Namely, for each
party, there is a local map that reduces their part of the full state to the target
space. However, we could think of a more general map between bipartite, or
multipartite, observable sets that preserve the structure of separable states,
i.e.that never map a separable state in the full space to an entangled state in
the target space. This extra condition adds an additional complication in finding
the squashing map, however it also allows a map which is more general, which
could provide a broader formalism to handle a wider variety of measurements
in entanglement verification.
Another possibility for future work could be to find a quantitative measure
of entanglement of the full system, given a reconstruction on the level of the
target system. To do this we first consider an entanglement measure E. An
entanglement measure is simply a function used to quantify the amount of en-
tanglement a given state has [HHHH09]. Its input is a quantum state, and its
output is a constant: E(ρ) = c. Typically entanglement measures are chosen
such that if the output c = 0, then the input state ρ was separable. If the output
c > 0, then state was entangled. Another property of entanglement measures is
that they should not increase the amount of entanglement in a state under the
application of local operations and classical communication (LOCC). In other
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words, E is LOCC monotone: (where here we focus on the bipartite case)
E(ρAB) ≥ E(ΛLOCC[ρAB]), (3.14)
where ΛLOCC is a LOCC transformation—a particular case of a CPTP map. In
particular this means that E is monotone with respect to CPTP local operations:
E(ρAB) ≥ E((ΛA ⊗ ΛB)[ρAB]). (3.15)
Thus, if we use the squashing model realized by local CPTP maps, the entan-
glement of the reconstructed squashed state (ΛA ⊗ ΛB)[ρAB] is a lower bound
for the entanglement of the physical state actually prepared. It can be shown
that it is possible to generalize Eqn. 3.15 to the case of positive but not com-
pletely positive maps, at least for the entanglement measure called negativity
[Z+98, VW02], which is one of the few entanglement measures that can be
easily computed (cf. [MGB+09]). This may make it possible to use the recon-
structed state in the target space to give a quantitative bound on the amount




The ultimate goal of the squashing model is to help, along with other theoretical
tools, to accurately describe experimental setups in quantum communication.
We have provided necessary and sufficient conditions to find whether a given full
measurement is connected to a target measurement via the squashing model.
The existence of a squashing model in QKD implies that a security proof that
assumes a small-dimensional input (such as a qubit) is measured, can be ap-
plied to a full optical implementation of the same protocol. In entanglement
verification, a positive entanglement verification for a simplified set of target
measurement operators is valid, even when the full measurement operators more
accurately describe the measurement. In other quantum communication con-
texts, the squashing model validates the assumption that a simple target mea-
surement is performed, even when the full measurement is what really describes
the measurement.
We prove that several examples of detectors have squashing models, such
as the BB84 measurement with active or passive basis choice, and the six-state
measurement with a passive basis choice. While most of the examples do have
a squashing model, it is important to note that some do not. For example, the
six-state polarization measurement with an active basis choice does not have
a squashing model which would be useful for QKD. Therefore the squashing
model cannot be assumed for a given measurement; its existence should be
verified. The formalism in this thesis provides a systematic method to find
squashing models both analytically, and numerically. In the numerical case, it
may be possible to find evidence supporting the existence of a squashing model,
or disprove its existence.
We have also considered imperfections in measurements to see their effect
on the existence of a squashing model. Although some imperfections have been
accounted for, it is important to include a more general characterization of
imperfections within the full measurement of the squashing model. This can be
done with the formalism provided in this thesis, but requires a reevaluation of
the examples considered previously.
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Appendix
4.1 Alternate Proof of the BB84 Measurement
Squashing Map: Active Basis Choice
Here we perform an alternate proof for the existence of a squashing model
for the BB84 measurement with an active basis measurement. This proof is
an elaboration of the proof in Section 2.3.1. The proof that follows is more
illustrative of a general procedure of solving the conditions given in Eqn. 2.3
explicitly than the proof given in the main text. We start from Section 2.3.1,
where we are concerned with finding a squashing model for n photons to a single
photon in the subspace P .
Depending on the parity of the number of incoming photons detected by the
QND measurement proceeding the squashing map, n, one of the squashing maps,
τodd or τeven, will be applied. Consider the case where the photon number, n,
is odd. The case where n = 1 is clearly trivial. The following is an orthonormal

















where we define Cg ≡
√


























in the standard basis. The full measurement operators F (b,α)M, n from Eqn. (2.4)






2 0 0 0
0 b2 0 0
0 0 14 0
0 0 0 14
, F (b,x)M, n = 14 + (−1)b4

0 s 0 t
s 0 t 0
0 t 0 u
t 0 u 0

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where 1 is the 4× 4 identity matrix and we define the constants s ≡ 21−n, t ≡
sC1, u ≡ 1− s. To obtain the vectorized forms of the POVM elements |F (b,α)Q 〉〉
and |F (b,α)M 〉〉, the columns of their matrix form can be concatenated into vectors.
We can now impose Eqns. (2.3a) on the adjoint squashing map for the sub-
space P . Note that τR maps real vectors into real vectors (Eqn. (2.3a)), and
therefore the complex conjugate (τR)∗ also maps these same vectors to ea-
chother. Therefore, the average of these two also performs the mapping, so we
can assume that τR only contains real entries, without loss of generality. Also
note that the POVM elements |F (b,α)Q 〉〉 do not span their complete vector space,
and so τR is not completely determined by the linear constraints. Here we keep
the undetermined entries as open parameters ai, and after applying the linear
constraints we have τodd:
1 0 0 a1 0 a2 0 a3
0 0 s− a1 0 −a2 0 t− a3 0
0 s− a1 0 0 0 a4 0 a5
a1 0 0 1 t− a4 0 −a5 0
0 −a2 0 t− a4 12 0 0 a6
a2 0 a4 0 0 12 u− a6 0
0 t− a3 0 −a5 0 u− a6 12 0
a3 0 a5 0 a6 0 0 12

.
Next, we find the remaining open parameters to ensure that this map is pos-
itive semidefinite. To ensure this, all of its subdeterminants must be positive.
Consider the following two-by-two determinants listed by the rows and columns
they come from in the matrix for τodd above: (2, 3), (2, 5), (2, 7), (3, 6), (3, 8).
From these we get a1 = s, a2 = 0, a3 = t, a4 = 0, a5 = 0. This only leaves one
open parameter, a6, which can be found by applying the vector
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1,−1, 0) to both sides of the above matrix, which should result
in a positive scalar. This implies that a6 ≥ 1/2 − s. Similarly applying
(1, 0, 0,−1, C1, 0, 0,−C1) gives a6 ≤ 1/2− s, and therefore a6 = 1/2− s. With
all of the parameters determined, the eigenvalues of this map are found to be
non-negative. Therefore, the adjoint squashing map exists. This means that
there exists a squashing map for an odd number of photons, and since there are
no open parameters left, it is unique.
Now consider the case where the QND measurement of the number of pho-
tons is even, n ≥ 2. Following a similar procedure to the odd case, we have the
same orthonormal basis as before except with the last two vectors of the basis
for the subspace P changed to:
|φ3〉= 1√2 (|n, 0〉x − |0, n〉x)
|φ4〉= 1C2
(√
2n−3(|n, 0〉x + |0, n〉x)− |n,0〉z+|0,n〉z√2
) (4.3)

























2sC2. Solving the linear equations (2.3a), we get the adjoint
squashing map τeven with open parameters di:
1 0 0 d1 0 d2 0 d3
0 0 −d1 0
√
s− d2 0 −d3 0
0 −d1 0 0 0 d4 0 d5
d1 0 0 1
√





s− d4 12 0 0 d6
d2 0 d4 0 0 12 v − d6 0
0 −d3 0 d5 0 v − d6 12 0
d3 0 d5 0 d6 0 0 12

.
Note that if n = 2 then |φ4〉 vanishes, so τeven is given by removing the last
two rows and columns in this matrix. Looking at the same locations for the
two-by-two subdeterminants as in the odd case it can be seen that: d1 = 0, d2 =√
s, d3 = 0, d4 = 0, d5 = 0. Now consider the two three-by-three determinants
(1, 6, 7) and (4, 5, 8). From the first we get v2/4 − d26 ≥ 0 and so d6 ≤ v/2.
From the second we get −d26 + 2
√
1− 22−nd6 + 3 · 2−n − 3/4 ≥ 0. This can
be rewritten as ∆d(∆d − v) ≤ 0, where ∆d = d6 − v/2, which implies that
v/2 ≤ d6. Combining these results gives d6 = v/2. The eigenvalues of this map
can also be shown to be non-negative. Therefore, the squashing map exists, and
is uniquely determined.
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